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AGENDA FOR DEVELOPMENT

Note by the President of the General Assembly

The President of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly has the honour to submit to the members of the Assembly his note on the open-ended and broad-based consultations on an agenda for development (see annex, sect. I), as well as his summary on the World Hearings on Development (see annex, sect. II), prepared pursuant to paragraph 3 of Assembly resolution 48/166 of 21 December 1993, in which the Assembly, inter alia, invited the President of the General Assembly to promote, as early as possible in 1994, in an open-ended format, broad-based discussions and exchange of views on an agenda for development, on the basis of the report of the Secretary-General requested in its resolution 47/181.

* A/49/150.

ANNEX

OPEN-ENDED AND BROAD-BASED CONSULTATIONS ON AN AGENDA FOR DEVELOPMENT

I. Note by the President of the General Assembly

Introduction

1. In resolution 48/166 the General Assembly invited its President to promote,

> "in an open-ended format ... broad-based discussions and an exchange of views on an agenda for development, on the basis of the report of the Secretary-General requested in its resolution 47/181".

It also requested the Secretary-General to submit further recommendations to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session,

> "taking into account the views expressed during the substantive session of 1994 of the Economic and Social Council, as well as the views promoted by the President of the General Assembly and summarized under his own responsibility".

2. The summary of the World Hearings on Development is provided in response to the General Assembly's request. In addition, this note draws attention to some concerns and issues heard during the Hearings and in my other consultations.

3. I would like to comment first on the idea of holding such Hearings. Most governments take advantage of opportunities to consult with experts or interested parties as well as with those directly affected by proposed policies. Many also hold public hearings as a way to improve the quality of pending legislation. Likewise, the United Nations can improve its effectiveness, and image, by being even more willing to draw on international advisory groups whose members are not appointed as representatives of states but are chosen worldwide for their distinction in fields related to the situation at hand. This enables the United Nations to remain well-informed of what is pertinent in the development domain and to heed more directly a wider variety of human experience. The Hearings confirmed the value of widening the range of participants in the development dialogue at all levels.

4. The observations and discussions at the World Hearings addressed the five dimensions of development referred to in the Secretary-General's report - peace, the economy, the environment, society and democracy. My sense is that these five dimensions were agreed to be pillars forming a good philosophical basis for further discussion.

5. I will not dwell on the lively discussions about the varieties of development strategies, the relationship between peace and development, or whether democracy is a prerequisite for development or the many other subjects touched upon. If I were to take that route I would have to comment on matters on which opinions differ as to precise interpretations. I detected some impatience with new development fashions and attempts to say what development should be. Though an agenda for development cannot be a blueprint or a textbook for development in its entirety, such an agenda, it was generally agreed, requires a fundamental political commitment on the part of Member States.

6. In this Note, I shall retain from that general discussion about development only a few elements which emphasise major changes in the world situation and new perceptions of development.

7. My focus will then shift to the central questions which the United Nations system must address in order to contribute to world development in a more effective way. This was a major preoccupation of the participants in the World Hearings on Development most of whom had long familiarity with the United Nations.

The variety of development experience

8. A new agenda for development offers an opportunity to recognize that much is happening which makes inappropriate traditional ways of talking about the challenges of world development. The record of development reflects progress and setbacks.

9. At one end of the development spectrum, many Western developed countries are beset by high and persistent unemployment and large budget deficits, with the result that they do not feel as affluent as before. Formerly centrally planned economies are faced with extraordinary problems of political, social and economic transition which have turned out to be more difficult than was thought only a few years ago.

10. Elsewhere, some countries which two or three decades ago were at the same economic level as others which today remain poor, have already reached per capita income levels that exceed those of many OECD countries. They have pushed back poverty and illiteracy, and have undertaken ambitious education and health programmes. They have become major exporters of manufactures and creditworthy actors in international capital markets. They have graduated from dependency on development assistance and are ready to engage in helping weaker countries.

11. At the other end of the spectrum, development has not taken off in the least developed countries. Sub-Saharan Africa continues to present a particularly difficult development

challenge. Here, as in other regions, military conflicts, mostly internal, persist and escalate, political stability is often precarious and elusive. Even where peace has been preserved, living standards have deteriorated in recent decades. Capital flight has reached disastrous proportions and debt problems remain intractable. Disenchantment with structural adjustment programmes is widespread, and when occasional resumption of growth has occurred it is far from restoring living conditions to former levels.

12. World-wide, development issues have changed, and generalisations about developing countries which date back several decades are no longer meaningful. Trade and investment issues are becoming of greater concern than Official Development Assistance, especially for the rapidly advancing group of countries but also in many of the poorer ones. Likewise, trade and technical cooperation among developing countries has become an increasingly important strategy for optimising development potential.

13. A credible agenda for development which shows that the UN system is ready and able to do its share should reflect the new complexity and diversity, the progress as well as the setbacks, and the opportunities.

Calls for new approaches

14. Many profound changes in the world call for rethinking of development. The end of the Cold War and the difficulties of the economies in transition, the accelerating globalization, the new emphasis on sustainable human development, and the rise of environmental concerns are among the most obvious ones.

15. Market-driven globalization for better or worse, appears to be an irreversible trend which affects all countries. Its full implications are not yet clear but it obviously erodes the autonomy of nation states and their ability to control their economic destiny. Non-state actors with a global reach have important roles in the network of international cooperation that is emerging.

16. The shift towards greater reliance on markets on all continents has been so swift and so strong as to raise concerns that the fundamental roles and responsibilities of government may be neglected or slighted and that uniform approaches are being tried where they are not appropriate. Countries in early stages of development have special need of strong government capable of doing what markets do not do to provide infrastructure, ensure education and health, and, indeed, to make markets work.

17. Market driven forces are increasing the supply of capital in a growing albeit still limited number of developing countries. For others, which still lack adequate access to development

capital and other resources, official development assistance remains necessary. In such cases, more innovative ways of development financing have to be explored. Many constructive proposals have been around for some time such as statutory commitments and a tax on international capital movements. These merit urgent consideration.

18. The key perspective of the Hearings is that sustained growth in developed areas of the world depends also on raising living standards in developing areas of the world. Development should therefore be seen as an aspect of the management of the world economy as a whole in which the real interests of poor countries as well as rich countries are taken seriously into account rather than, as before, a niche for the negotiation of financial and technical assistance. In the same vein, emphasis should be put on mutual interest in international development cooperation rather than on the obligations of some for the benefit of others.

19. Development aims at more than growth in production. It involves the broad empowerment and participation of people, women equally with men, in the enlargement of their choices. The notion of people-centred development includes a greater investment in their own development and well-being. Education and health provisions and related social services, with a special focus on the young, women and the elderly, deserve to be accorded the highest priority in all societies. An agenda for development must enhance the framework for international cooperation in these areas.

20. There remain gaps and contradictions between development rhetoric and the actual thrust of international development cooperation. The mitigation and elimination of poverty receives much lipservice but less concrete attention. Much concern is voiced in donor countries about the excessive growth of population and about the inadequacy of social services in poor countries, but only marginal amounts of development assistance are directed to the support of population policies and not much more to education and health, or to programmes aimed at lifting the role and status of women. Proposals linking a quantitative target of official development assistance to a quantitative target of spending on education, health and social welfare by a recipient government, point in the right direction.

21. Sustainable development and many of the other far-sighted and important goals agreed to in the Rio Conference and Agenda 21 are proving difficult to pursue. There is no denying that there is much disenchantment about the achievement of international development cooperation in the past, and much scepticism about its usefulness in the future. It would be advisable to recognize this from the outset and make a vigorous plea for a new approach based on mutual benefit through the reconciling of different interests.

22. This takes me to the observations I wish to make about the issues relating specifically to the United Nations and its role and contribution to international development cooperation.

The need for change and reform

23. My consultations and discussions revealed a considerable variety of views about the reasons why an agenda for development was called for, and about the objectives it should serve. At the World Hearings on Development, it was described as an opportunity to set guidelines for international development cooperation in the rest of the 1990s and beyond. Many thoughtful suggestions were made regarding its purposes and contents in this regard. In all of these the United Nations, with its universal membership and broad political mandate and with the large number of programmes and agencies associated with it in the UN system, was accorded a central role.

24. There is indeed no shortage of good ideas and practicable proposals for UN actions. The Hearings underlined elements which recur at meetings of ECOSOC and have already been examined at the Summit for Children in 1990 and at the Environment Summit in Rio in 1992 and that will be further elaborated at the Population Conference in Cairo, at the Social Summit in Copenhagen, at the Beijing Conference on Women and at the Habitat II Conference in Istanbul in 1996. What is clearly missing is a machinery to concentrate and focus international political will, and to ensure that international development policies are put into action.

25. The Hearings showed a sense of dissatisfaction with the present performance of the system, and especially with the role of the United Nations itself in the economic and social areas. Its authority and political relevance in these fields have eroded, and governments take little notice of economic deliberations in the UN. No agenda for development would be of interest unless it included proposals for serious change, not just tinkering with the existing structures and routines.

26. The other key theme running through the testimonies at the Hearings was the need to raise major negotiations in the UN on economic and social policy issues to a high political level. Consensus resolutions in the GA and ECOSOC which are reached at an often relatively low diplomatic level are generally ignored. Similarly, although development issues are often said to be interrelated, they are largely treated in isolation and mostly discussed only by diplomats attached to ministries of foreign affairs, not by Ministers of Finance meeting at the U.N.

27. The agencies of the Bretton Woods system, and the GATT, while intended to be an integral part of the United Nations have maintained a separate character. The tasks of global economic policy coordination and determination have also come to be assumed exclusively by groups such as the G7 and OECD. The real development decisions are made outside the UN

and will continue to be made there unless the organization is reformed in such a way that it is of interest to governments and takes a governmental view of development issues.

28. Based on my consultations and the World Hearings on Development, I set out below a number of key issues to be addressed. Although I am fully aware that these issues are politically charged and may be regarded as controversial, I do not think that avoidance would be helpful at this juncture. What I do hope is that raising them will help focus attention on the machinery required to enable the U.N. to examine and act on the plethora of proposals such as those arising at the Hearings.

Some policy issues

(i) New Economic Policy-Making Body

29. The elaboration of a UN Agenda for Development must consider the issue of establishment of a high-level body on development and economic policy which would lift the political status of these matters to that of peace in the Security Council. Such a body would meet in permanent session with permanent economic representatives and its membership, though limited in number, should be representative of the UN family of nations. When appropriate, its sessions should be attended by ministers of development, trade or finance depending on the issue. The agenda could be set by the Secretary-General but agenda items may be introduced at the request of any member state. Its decision-making might follow the example of the Global Environmental Facility.

30. Decisions taken by this new body should be followed up and carried out by those parts of the United Nations system which are directly involved, including the Bretton Woods Institutions and the World Trade Organization, all of which should collaborate under its authority in setting development policy. The General Assembly should receive reports and monitor progress in the implementation of decisions of the new body.

31. It is understood that such a change should blend with any accepted reform for the enlargement of the Security Council. The Security Council should be informed by this new body of development failures that could lead to threats to peace and security. They should both work together in post-conflict peace building arrangements.

32. The main functions of this body would be to provide political impulses for actions to be carried out in the field of development and to ensure effective global macro-economic policy coordination. By so doing the goal of returning the UN to the centre of such policy determination will be realised.

33. The decisions of the new high-level body should be transformed into binding protocols, conventions and other instruments in order to strengthen the international legal framework.

34. I believe that the basis for such a new body already exists within the Charter. Consideration can be given to the transformation of ECOSOC to effectively meet these requirements.

(ii) Policy Coordination

35. The process of elaborating an agenda for development presents a useful opportunity to review the need for concentrating under a single entity, responsibilities for development and economic policy coordination within the United Nations, taking into account the work of the proposed high-level body. This approach will ensure effective policy coordination especially among the main UN development funds and programmes. It should aim at eliminating areas of unnecessary overlap and duplication of work as well as the consolidation of operational activities in the field. At a very minimum, extensive rationalization of work should result from such a concentration which should be designed to impact on development policy formulation and implementation within the United Nations.

36. Another issue is the appointment of Heads of Agencies concerned directly with development. One possiblity would be to confirm such appointments in the General Assembly, through the new high-level body, upon the recommendation of the Secretary-General following his own consultations. This could make more effective coordination and cooperation within the UN system. A body consisting of the heads of the principal economic and social agencies, including the Bretton Woods institutions and the World Trade Organisation, meeting regularly under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General should function as a commission for the UN development system.

(iii) Development Policy

37. Ending the marginalization of developing countries and countries in transition and integrating them into the world economy should be a priority task of the high-level body. This means covering the full gamut of international debt, finance, technology, trade, and structural adjustment programmes and their repercussions and providing broad guidelines to those parts of the UN system best suited for their implementation.

38. Sustainable human development is about improving the human condition for which economic growth is necessary but not sufficient. It has to be accompanied by social, environmental and humanitarian progress. The United Nations system has elaborated goals and targets in these areas. Another priority task of the high-level body should be to review and harmonize these various goals and targets for internal consistency and attainability and for establishing comparative advantages.

39. Development policy should at all times embody the principle of prevention. On this basis an agenda for development must direct critical focus on areas of weakness that could

give rise to complex emergencies stemming from a breakdown of order in societies. In this case, institution building is of particular relevance and assistance in strengthening civil, political, judicial and other national institutions should be an issue for primary consideration. Such a consideration must also apply to societies emerging from conflict, thereby maintaining the imperative link between emergency assistance, reconstruction and development.

(iv) Development Financing

40. The issue of the decline in resources for the financing of international development activities must be faced. Consideration could be given to international indirect taxation and the creation of a development fund as additional sources of finance for development. Multinational businesses and cross-border financial transactions may be explored as tax generators.

41. There should be a code of conduct for development financing, along the lines developed by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD to take account of previously established agreements and the new approach to financing now being proposed. In a number of, mostly poor, developing countries the burden of external debt and its servicing remain intractable. These countries are also in need of external finance for development, mostly ODA, as domestically generated savings are often insufficient and private flows not forthcoming. While trade, not aid, is a valid slogan, for the poor developing countries this is not yet a realistic option.

v) Trade

42. There are widespread concerns that the new international trading system arising out of the Uruguay Round may, in the balance, not be of the desired benefit to many developing countries and that these could be left out of effective participation in the workings of the new World Trade Organization. An important issue is to ensure that this new international entity adopt genuinely transparent methods of work, that its members are held accountable to their expressed commitment to multilateralism and that it truly serves the cause of a more balanced global structural adjustment. It should be organically linked with the United Nations through the new high-level body.

(vi) Africa

43. Commitments made and initiatives undertaken in the framework of the U.N's Agenda for the Development of Africa in the Nineties must be urgently pursued. The complexity and severity of Africa's predicament merit particular attention. Much of the advice tendered and policies followed in the past have been inappropriate, while resources allocated for development have been inadequate. African recovery is not only in the interest of its own people; disintegration and unrest is a threat to peace and security and a failure to help

improve the human condition of a whole continent would be a moral and political defeat for the United Nations. Africa remains the great test of an effective Agenda for Development.

(vii) Peace and Development

44. Finally, peace is essential for long-term development. Inversely, lack of development can breed social conflict and political instability, and the present world scene does not lack examples. Political instability fuels the traffic in arms and nuclear proliferation. Under the Charter it is the responsibility of the Security Council to guarantee peace. The permanent members who provide the bulk of arms exports, should lead the way in reducing the production and export of arms. The effective monitoring of arms flows, at national, regional and international levels is a necessary condition for peace and development.

Conclusion

45. The issues I have put forward address key areas where decisions and actions are called for in elaborating a UN Agenda for Development. They emphasize the need for change both in the conceptions of world development issues and in international institutions. The world is changing rapidly, and if the United Nations lags behind it will surely fade away as a force and an instrument to pursue the noble objectives of its Charter.

OPEN-ENDED AND BROAD-BASED CONSULTATIONS ON AN AGENDA FOR DEVELOPMENT

II. Summary of the World Hearings on Development

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present document summarizes the World Hearings on Development convened by the President of the General Assembly in New York from 6-10 June, 1994. Its purpose is an analytical synthesis of the many views and proposals presented at the Hearings. As a background to the discussion, the participants (see Appendix) had before them the Report of the Secretary-General - An Agenda for Development - A/48/935.

2. The first part of the report, World Development Perspectives in the mid-199Os, deals with the substantive issues discussed and their national and international policy implications. The second part describes the need for an agenda for development. The third part highlights the proposals and initiatives with regard to the role of the United Nations system in the economic and social fields.

3. Although it is premature to draw full conclusions as to the value of the hearings to the development debate in the United Nations, it is none the less clear that this experiment has yielded rich results. A more informal and less structured debate which drew on expertise from actors outside both governments and the United Nations system permitted greater frankness and a more animated exchange of views than is often the case in the formal meetings of the Organization. In particular, the inclusion of non-state actors proved useful, certainly when it is realized that much in the development domain is being carried on outside the United Nations. In view of the above, it would be worthwhile to consider holding similar gatherings in the future.

II. WORLD DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES IN THE MID-1990S

A. A changing world

4. One theme running through the hearings was the enormousness and rapidity of changes in world political and economic conditions in recent times. International political relations were shaken by the end of the cold war, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the demise of communism which altered relationships between countries in the world in ways that have not yet been sorted out. The transition to market economies in eastern Europe and the successor states of the U.S.S.R. also involves their integration into the world economy and membership of international organizations, such as the IMF, GATT, and the World Bank. As a result, these bodies have become almost universal institutions.

5. As cold war considerations have faded in international relations, new ones have come to the fore. Donor countries and international financial institutions have become more concerned about democratization, human rights, and good governance and conditionality has increased accordingly. In a trend that preceded the end of the cold war and occurred in part due to popular pressures, multi-party democracies have been established in many developing countries.

6. The end of the cold war and economic difficulties also meant a large reduction of their aid flows from Russia and the other eastern European countries to the developing regions. Some of the market economies, such as the United States, also reduced their aid flows. Moreover, the transition to democracy and market economies in the formerly centrally planned economies has seized the attention and resources of donors and multilateral institutions. On the positive side, the developed countries and the countries in transition have also reduced their military assistance and intervention and the end of the cold war has allowed cooperation in issues of peace and security between the former adversaries. Its end has directly or indirectly contributed to the movement towards peace in several countries, although other conflicts have emerged. Finally, its end has changed siqnificantly the character of North-South relations.

7. Another major change has been the extraordinary diversity of development experience in the countries that are still referred to as "developing countries". A number of them have become some of the most dynamic economies in the world and have attained levels of income comparable to or even higher than some of the industrial countries of OECD. They have shown that rapid development is possible. Other countries, notably those of sub-Saharan Africa but also other poor countries, have become further impoverished. The gap in the world and within the developing region itself is increasing. The notion that developing countries were all alike and shared a common destiny has been eroded. This diversity in development experience partly reflects the differences in economic, social, political, and institutional conditions, policies, and starting positions. Analysis of the developing countries as a group, if ever possible, is less feasible now because of the diversity of experience and of interests among them. Some developing countries have joined the OECD; others are to follow. This might further blur North-South distinctions in the future.

8. A third major change has been the unexpected slowdown in the economies of the industrial countries. Beset by high unemployment and budget deficits, they no longer feel as affluent as they used to. They experience pressures to cut their spending on urgent domestic needs and to be less generous in foreign aid.

9. Over and above these changes in economic fortunes, there have been powerful changes in thinking about economic policy, the respective roles of the State and markets, and an emergence of new or rediscovered concerns.

10. An increasingly important development affecting all countries has been the process of market-driven globalization. Globalization is often understood to refer to the increasing integration of world markets of goods, services, capital, technoloqy, and, to a lesser extent, labour. Yet, the wider dissemination of ideas, culture, and lifestyles and the cross-boundary effects of environmental problems are also important manifestations of the globalization process. Market liberalization and technological development are two key driving forces behind globalization. Telecommunications allow for the instantaneous transfer of information and money. Increased transport capabilities move more goods and people more rapidly. This trend to globalization is an irreversible reality.

11. An important consequence of globalization has been the erosion of the autonomy and sovereignty of the nation state and the increasing importance of non-state actors, such as transnational corporations, private financial institutions that operate globally, and NGOs. With the sheer multitude of actors and the large sums of money many of them command, the possibility for individual Governments to formulate and implement policies effectively - whether regarding exchange rates, interest rates, or wages - has declined.

12. Many - often poor - countries, however, have been excluded from the globalization process. These countries are mainly exporters of primary commodities which have become less and less important in world trade. Hence, in a world of ever greater globalization, they risk increasing marginalization if they and the international community remain passive.

13. Other negative dimensions of the globalization process are the loss of cultural diversity, and increased environmental stress. Attempts to escape the implications of globalization can lead to xenophobia and increased protectionism. The protection of the environment is not a new idea, but it is gaining political relevance as it is increasingly recognized to be a condition of human survival on this planet. The planet is a physical unit, and environmental problems raise perhaps a more forceful call than any other for global cooperation. The recognition of such global needs has been one of the positive aspects of recent times.

14. The essential fact that development is about the betterment of the human condition was recognized and reaffirmed many times. That is nothing new, but the attempt to elevate it to a higher political level is. This has been brought about in part by the emergence of many new actors, among which non-governmental organizations have been prominent.

B. Human development

15. The importance of human development recurred throughout the hearings. Development is about people and is undertaken by people. Countries that lack a "critical mass", not just of infrastructure but also of educated people, find it difficult to embark on sustained development. An uneducated and unskilled labour force implies low worker productivity which also slows technological progress and is a barrier to attracting international capital. For these reasons, investing in the improvement of human resources - particularly in health, training and education - is seen as very productive and a prerequisite to long-term development. In the long-term, development itself depends on each generation being able to pass on to its successors the ability to realize their own potential. Environmental considerations must then come into play when a long-term horizon is considered. Human development should, then, mean sustainable human development.

16. However, the new development model based on "human development" did not go unquestioned. Care has to be taken to ensure that any objective such as sustainable human development is not given too broad a meaning. Otherwise it would cease to serve as a meaningful guide to action. Some speakers pointed out that the old model to foster economic growth based on fiscal responsibility, self-reliance and hard work has still much to offer. Early

international assistance to the now fast-growing countries of Asia had gone primarily to physical infrastructure like highways, power plants and telecommunications, as well as to health. Yet, mobilization of domestic savings played a major role and, without economic growth, there would be few resources for undertaking sustainable human development.

17. Most of the resources that are devoted to sustainable human development come from the developing countries themselves. It was felt that some of the progress that had been made in the extension of their health and education facilities was being jeopardized by budget cuts that are often the prerequisite of receiving financial assistance from the Bretton Woods institutions. It was thought that these institutions were relying on too simplistic a model in many of their recommendations.

18. A more general point was made that any agenda for action depended, implicitly or explicitly, on an under-lying theoretical framework. There was a danger that a simplistic version of the predominant theoretical framework would be used as a guide for action and prescriptions in all countries and in all circumstances. Moreover, although technological progress increased a society's ability to augment the resources available to its members, there was no guarantee that the dividends of that progress would be distributed among the population in an equitable manner. Institutions had to be in place to help achieve this.

19. Development was not just concerned with improving the potential of individuals to undertake economic activity, but also to participate more actively in the life of their society. Individuals should feel that they had a degree of control over their destiny, that they belonged to a community. There were many different communities in which the individual participated, from the global to the local, grass-roots level. The NGOs played a major role at the grass-roots level, and, indeed, in almost all aspects of human development.

20. It was important for any of the communities to which the individual belonged to be open and promote tolerance, mutual respect and societal cohesion: xenophobia or religious and cultural intolerance resulted from attempts to build a feeling of community on exclusionary principles. The rights of minorities should be fully respected and cultural diversity preserved and fostered. At the same time, society should not disintegrate into competing groups lacking any common bonds.

21. The empowerment of members of society is an essential aspect of participation; that of women is of crucial importance. Women play a major role in economic activity, such as in agriculture in developing countries, yet often they are not rewarded for their efforts, or have to contend with formal and informal discrimination against them. Removal of all discriminatory barriers should be an essential part of any development strategy.

22. The empowerment of women is highly relevant to questions of fertility and population growth. Total fertility rates have fallen in the developing countries, partly as a result of family planning programmes, but also because of other social changes which have improved the status of women. Family planning programmes could not tackle the question of wanted fertility. The

latter was a matter in which women actually have, or should have, a major say. Providing incentives to enable women to stay in school and removing discrimination against them would further reduce the desired family size, as would taxation measures that reduced income inequalities within countries.

23. The demographic transition is taking place everywhere, although at different rates. However, population is growing fastest in the poorest countries, resulting in a very young population and making it difficult for these countries to provide the schools and other infrastructure needed. Population pressures are also adding to the world's environmental problems, although the greatest amount of pollution and environmental degradation per person is being generated in the richer countries which have low population growth rates. Population dynamics are increasing pressures for migration.

24. One question which generated some differences in opinion was that of participation in the political life of the country. This was tied in with the question of good governance but some of the arguments implied that the democratic model should be an inherent part of the agenda to achieve not only good governance but also human development. Some participants in the hearings were concerned that one particular model for organizing the government of a country was being imposed on developing countries without concern for their stage of development or the unique features of their societies. There was considerable concern about political conditionalities being tied to bilateral and multilateral assistance. According to some interventions, the fact that a country had several political parties did not necessarily guarantee true democracy and respect for human rights and the rule of law.

25. Some argued that a strong government is necessary to enact and enforce, against popular opposition when the pains of the initial adjustment are being felt most strongly, institutional and marketfriendly reforms. These reforms would produce the economic growth which would lead to a vibrant and viable democracy. A similar argument was that a well-educated and benevolent ruling elite could itself foster development by encouraging improvements in the status, and particularly the education, of the bulk of the population. In turn, a better educated population would itself demand better government, creating a virtuous circle towards better governance and greater democracy. This argument that a well educated population could precede democracy and that a paternalistic elite could be trusted to operate in the country's best interest without the checks and balances of democratic processes was also questioned. However, there was general agreement that there was a steady and welcome move towards greater democracy throughout the world.

C. Peace, security and development

26. Peace, security and development were seen as being inextricably linked. Peace and security fostered development, and development itself could be severely set back by war. However, at the international level, it would be wrong to suggest that development must await peace: there should be no sequencing between peace and development. Historically, there had

not been a connection between peace and development - the well established democracies all emerged from conflict.

27. Many present-day conflicts are within and not between countries and, as shown by the example of the former Yugoslavia, the level of development is often not an indicator of the potential for conflict. After a war is over, the millions of unexploded mines left behind could make large areas of a country unsafe. The developed countries are large producers of mines, even though their production does not seem to generate particularly large profits for them.

28. Development is not just required for a more peaceful world - it is essential in itself. Countries that are faced with splits in their societies but are trying successfully to heal them and to develop peacefully should not be neglected as recipients of assistance in favour of those countries that have been less successful in solving their internal problems.

29. There is no contradiction between expenditures on development assistance and on peace-keeping. Development spending at the present time would avoid much greater peace-keeping expenditures in the future. Similarly, there are instances when "preventive development" could help defuse a conflict in a poor country.

30. It had been hoped that, with the end of the Cold War, there would be not only a decrease in military expenditure in the developed countries but a transfer of resources to the developing countries. This hope has not been realized. The large volume of global military expenditures was contrasted with the considerably smaller flows of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and the relatively small cost to the international community of tackling some pressing global problems: such as lack of basic health services in many developing countries.

31. At the same time as military spending has tended to fall in many developed countries, arms flows from them to poorer countries is continuing. Military spending has increased in some developing countries. Some medium powers are becoming involved in areas which no longer interest the major powers. The Security Council, in particular the five permanent members which were the major arms suppliers, has a role to play in restricting the trade in weapons. Regional bodies, by monitoring military expenditures, could help to build up trust between countries and thereby reduce tensions. The question of whether it should be a matter of concern to the Bretton Woods institutions if a country's military spending exceeded a certain percentage of its GNP was raised.

32. The concept of security was seen to encompass not just preventing an armed attack, the traditional concept of security, but also ensuring the safety, welfare and basic rights of a nation's and of the world's citizens over the long-term. It was thought necessary to develop a concept of global comprehensive security that would encompass its socio-economic, political and military dimensions. Inter-disciplinary indicators of security could be developed as a logical evolution of the Social Indicators of Development. Sustainable development, including environmental protection, was felt to be the centre and core of a new, broader concept of

security. Existing security forces and institutions might have to be modified in the light of this broader concept of security.

33. The importance of the internal political arrangements of a country in ensuring its citizens' security was emphasized. Democratic states tended not to go to war with each other, while democracy allowed a country's citizens to discuss and solve their differences without a resort to arms. On too many occasions, the "security" that a country's military and police forces were meant to ensure was that of the undemocratically chosen ruler or the ruling elite. In these cases, it was the citizens who were repressed in their own country by forces often armed with weapons that had been purchased with funds from donors intended for development.

D. State and markets

34. Most themes at the hearings were informed by reference to the contribution that the State and markets could make - either positively or otherwise. The impact of the State and markets on development, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, is a key concern to national governments and the international community.

35. There was widespread recognition that the market is a relatively efficient instrument for promoting economic growth, but there was an increasing appreciation, arising from the East Asian experience, that the State and market can be mutually reinforcing partners. Hence, though there was unanimity on the need for policy approaches and reforms that are friendly to the market, there was an equally robust defence of how a positive stance by Government could make a major contribution to development. Government has a key strategic role in providing physical and social infrastructure and the sound macroeconomic management that creates an enabling environment for the private sector.

36. In this light, the function of Government is not purely to attend to market failures, whether poverty, unemployment or environmental stress, and structural rigidities. It is more positive than that: Government becomes the "facilitator" for market-induced changes; it is concerned with institutional and human resource capacity building, transparency, continuity and consistency in its operations, and, in general, it provides good governance.

37. What is needed is "a developmental market economy" rather than "a liberal market economy" - and for this Government has a major positive contribution to make. Indeed the counter-part to good domestic policies is Government participation in regional and international agreements regarding trade, finance and other mutually beneficial adjuncts to development. Hence, paradoxically, market-led globalization has been preceded by positive collaboration and agreements between states to enable the process to take root.

38. There was almost unanimity that market-driven globalization has conferred benefits in terms of both access to markets and investible funds, to a large number of countries. However, the globalization of markets, especially in the financial sphere, has not been an unqualified benefit to all countries and sections of the community. First, national economies can

be subject to pressures and significant fluctuations in their domestic currencies because of speculation and rapid movements of capital flows. Second, the effectiveness of domestic policy instruments is attenuated because of the globalization of financial markets and the interconnections of interest rates. Third, recessionary economic impulses can be propagated more easily as a result of the opening of national economies and the increasing importance of international trade for development. Domestic markets could not always overcome structural rigidities or internalize external factors adequately. This is particularly so in least developed countries.

39. The outcome of market forces is not always socially desirable; hence, the need for market intervention or for the state to adopt compensatory policies. At the international level, markets provide plenty of opportunities. Yet not every country can benefit in the same way. Several developing countries have experienced large inflows of capital in recent years, while in many others such flows are stagnant or declining. The agreements of the Uruguay Round will provide significant gains for developed countries and a considerable number of developing countries. But in many countries of the South, gains might be close to zero and in some, including African countries, there might even be a net loss.

40. Market failure and inappropriate state policies contributed to the growth of such phenomena as marginalization of the poor, structural unemployment and environmental degradation. Local governments, community organizations and NGOs could play a positive role in mitigating these problems, while contributing to empowerment of local and marginalized groups. There was a need to strengthen relations between NGOs and national administrations and for a better coordination of initiatives between NGOs and their international development partners.

41. Irrespective of global trends, good governance, transparency and continuity in policy-making were of immense importance in reassuring both markets and individual actors alike about the goals and interventions to address development issues.

42. It was acknowledged that it is not easy to transplant a given model, such as the East Asian, to other parts of the developing world. However, there were pertinent lessons that East Asian development held for other developing countries. These included keen attention to human capital formation, prudent macroeconomic management, export-led industrialization, infrastructure and institution building and the inculcation by the state of an entrepreneurial climate. In these circumstances, good governance and political stability are the hand maidens to society in its quest to promote continuity and flexibility in its economic policies, while balancing the interests and concerns of all sections and development partners.

43. Institutional and human resource constraints and the absence of other major prerequisites, such as public rationality or political stability, may militate against the effective operation of market processes. Hence, there is a real dilemma of whether to sequence the required interventions, keeping political stability and market processes high on the agenda, or

whether to push on all fronts for a radical transformation both in the economic and political life of a nation.

E. The African predicament

44. The special nature of the African predicament was a recurrent theme of the hearings. Massive poverty, malnutrition, illiteracy and poor health affect millions of its people. In relative terms and, as compiled in statistical indices, such as the Human Development Index, its countries are ranked at the bottom of the scale of material progress. However Africa is special in that, despite ample awareness of the facts, progress has been woefully slow and in some key areas, namely poverty, unemployment and the environment, there has been regression. This accounts for the uneasiness and frustration expressed both by the international development partners and national governments.

45. In the 1980s, most countries in sub-Saharan Africa experienced falling per capita incomes, investment rates and consumption. Rising external indebtedness and falling commodity prices further helped to label the 1980s as "the lost decade for Africa". The costs of the measures taken by national governments, at the strong insistence of the Bretton Woods institutions, to rectify macroeconomic disequilibria were borne mainly by the vulnerable groups in society and much social spending was cut. Present population growth rates for sub-Saharan countries are typically above 3 percent annually, which would indicate that improvements in living standards will be very slow and inadequate for the creation of the domestic savings and investment necessary to undertake the required development transformation.

46. The inability of African countries to attract private investment from abroad, despite the rigorous policy reforms in several countries and guarantees offered to expatriate the earnings from capital, is leaving the continent increasingly marginalized. This problem is compounded by the flight of private capital from Africa. Hence, the vital importance of increasing the volume and quality of overseas development assistance, even at a time when the developed world is experiencing recessionary pressures and donors' fatigue. Since neither domestic savings ratios nor inflows of private investment are adequate, a more brisk and comprehensive solution to Africa's debt burden is required.

47. Economic statistics alone do not adequately capture the plight of African countries in the last decade of the twentieth Century. The continuation or escalation of conflict in a number of the African countries is a matter of great concern not only because it sets back Africa's development agenda but also because of the inestimable destruction of human life and other scarce resources.

48. In the past, internal conflict had been aggravated by rivalry between the super-powers which had supported authoritarian governments who had built up a well armed military. In parts of Africa, military expenditures, instead of abating with the end of the cold war, enjoy a grim buoyancy. Hence, the continuum between security, peace and development is being rudely fragmented.

49. Conflict resolution and conflict repairment is not only a very expensive business but also one that diverts the energies of all development partners, and steals the attention from the agenda for development. Africa provides examples, albeit negative, of the desirability of peace and security for development - namely that without these prerequisites the setbacks to development are structural and long term.

50. While self-reliance, increasing people's participation and good governance remained the key factors for long-term development, international economic cooperation remains vital in supporting African efforts to remove bottlenecks and eliminate rigidities. Yet, the quest for self-reliance implies decreasing dependence on foreign experts and official financial assistance. Cooperation has to be designed in a way that foreign aid and expertise will be much more effective and efficient than in the past.

51. The hearings reminded their participants that, with the demographic transition, the population in the poorest countries tends to grow fastest. The rate of return of aid given to population policies was, thus, quite substantial in those countries.

52. Though prudent macroeconomic management was not a matter of deep contention, the equity and growth aspects of structural adjustment policies were. Several participants noted that in the case of Africa what was needed were policy reforms that were brought about in a context of growth. On the contrary, structural adjustment usually induces a period of stagnation or recession that could lead to the abandonment of those policies. The strictures of policy reforms, stressing the downsizing of public sector employment and cutbacks in social expenditure, are too blunt and likely to reduce the already meagre resources going to education and health services. Illiteracy is rampant in Africa and many health problems remain acute.

53. Unless safety nets are provided for the so-called "retrenched" public sector workers and the vulnerable groups, including women, children and the very poor, then the success of structural adjustment experiments will only remain nominal. Similarly, the important role of women as economic agents must be taken fully into account in order to assure the success of policy recommendations. This is not to downgrade the importance of policy reforms in Africa in which greater emphasis is being placed on the private sector and on the creation of an enabling environment by Government. Rather, the onus of proof concerning the impact of the reforms is shifting. There is an increasing need, in the case of structural adjustment, to demonstrate that fiscal probity can be matched with equity and sustained growth.

54. The concern shown over the predominant school on policy reforms in Africa, with its preoccupation with market processes and economic liberalization, is part of a wider uneasiness that the existing paradigms for development may not capture the complexity and severity of Africa's development predicament. Markets have to be created before they can respond to price signals: human and physical resource capacities have to be established for national institutions to be viable and for the rudiments of nation building to be in place. Environment, population and gender-sensitive issues are not likely to respond adequately to market signals which do not capture the long term aspects of their relationships.

55. Nation building, security and political stability are still matters of contention yet they are taken for granted by the prevailing paradigm on development. It is precisely because factual knowledge of these issues, in the case of Africa, far exceeds the capacity of development models to encompass them that an impasse seems to have been reached regarding the conclusiveness of the recent discussions. The contribution of the hearings was not only to agree on what we already know about Africa but also to admit modestly that much needs to be learned and to reinforce the commitment to carry it out.

F. International economic cooperation

56. International cooperation in the 1990s takes place in a rapidly changing world. As discussed above, the importance of markets has increased and non-state actors have multiplied and reduced the power of the state. International cooperation is as needed as ever, given the adverse effects of globalization, the many new opportunities open for countries and peoples, and the linkages that exist between peace, security, development, poverty and the environment. These linkages call for an integrated approach. Mutual trust and responsibility are important ingredients for effective cooperation, especially in cases where interests clash. Despite the changes in the world in recent years, the main areas of international cooperation remain trade, money, finance (including issues relating to debt and aid), and technology. The need to improve upon coordination in all these areas - among United Nations agencies, with the Bretton Woods Institutions, with the emerging World Trade Organization, with bilateral donor countries, and with non-state actors - was widely recognized.

57. Markets are a driving force for development but do not offer automatic compensation of the losers by the gainers. This is particularly disturbing when the losers are the weaker or more vulnerable countries. Hence, international safety nets are needed. To achieve that goal, and more generally to finance development, some witnesses proposed an international tax, e.g. on common resources, financial transactions, profits of transnational corporations, or international air travel.

58. There was agreement on the need to manage better the global economy. Most participants agreed that this should be aimed at improving world governance - such as setting goals and strategies and not aimed at achieving a world government with executive power. A new economic security council in the United Nations appeared as the appropriate way to improve global economic governance.

59. An internationally accepted system of rules of the game, norms, and standards was regarded as crucial to the management of globalization. Presently, in the name of protecting national interests, departures were made from these norms and standards. It was, for example, emphasized that several developed countries impose a restrictive trade policy while demanding liberalization in developing countries. Moreover, the norms and standards should entail some flexibility to allow for the special circumstances of the poorest countries. Excessive and multiple conditionality was also criticized.

60. There was some disagreement about the extent to which regionalism is compatible with multilateralism. Some saw it as incompatible and discriminatory to non-members. Others emphasized that regionalism can be an important element of stability and dynamism in the world economy. Regional economic integration could serve as a testing ground for new rules and stimulate replication. Moreover, regional blocs could be open to additional members and facilitate cooperation with non-member countries.

61. The conclusion of the Uruguay Round was generally regarded as a positive achievement because of the extension of the disciplines (e.g. on agriculture and textiles), authority and membership of GATT, the reinforcement of the system of dispute settlement and sanctions and the establishment of the WTO. Virtually all countries will be able to benefit from the reinforcement of the international trading system. However, the gains from the implementation of the Round agreements will not be distributed evenly. It was recognized that several, generally poor, countries were unlikely to benefit and might even lose under the Uruguay Round. Mechanisms should be devised to compensate the losers. Several participants emphasized that ultimately trade is more important than aid for the developing countries.

62. It was hoped that the WTO can reinforce the rules of the game of the international trading system and reverse what some saw as a trend towards bilateralism and unilateralism. Some participants feared that environmental and social standards would be used to introduce a new form of disguised protectionism. The WTO should prevent this. It was also recognized that the ILO Conventions provide a proper framework to improve social conditions of workers in developing countries.

63. International cooperation to oversee international financial flows and exchange and interest rates was emphasized. Reduction of long-term interest rates and of the volatility of exchange rates was advocated. It was, however, recognized that the scope for reaching these goals at the global level is small.

64. For low-income countries, concessional flows remain the main source of external finance. Despite arguments in favor of increased ODA relying upon mutual interest and moral and ethical considerations, the prospects are poor. Consequently, it was argued that ODA should focus on emergencies, the environment, and poverty alleviation in the poorest countries. Flows to these countries should increase. The establishment of an emergency fund, a peace dividend fund, and a new Marshall Plan were advocated. The need to improve the quality of aid, to involve the NGOs, and to promote compliance to commitments was also recognized. More careful planning, setting of realistic goals, untying, coordination and specialization among donors and multilateral sources of funds, and participation of target groups were mentioned as means to improve the quality and efficacy of aid.

65. Concerns were also raised about corruption which was recognized as a universal and historical phenomenon. Sometimes, financial flows to developing countries are returned to donor countries in the form of secret deposits to the accounts of corrupt officials. Transparency,

accountability, participation, and domestic and international oversight mechanisms would help to minimize misuse of funds.

66. It was agreed that debt remains a burden for many, especially low-income, countries. Proposed solutions differed, though. Some favored cancellation, some a case-by-case approach, preferably under the guidance of general criteria, and some argued that debt to the multilateral institutions should also be included in a solution. It was suggested that the capacity to service debt and the ability to alleviate poverty and achieve sustained growth should be guiding principles of any solution to the debt problem.

67. Technology was considered another main area for international cooperation. In this area as well, the poorest countries are largely unaffected by technology transfer because foreign direct investment is a major vehicle and is concentrated in the middle-income countries. A new partnership should focus on human development, emphasize the building of technology capacity (rather than mere transfer), and involve Governments, local firms and universities, in addition to foreign direct investment. There is in particular a need for technology transfer and close cooperation between North and South in the area of the environment.

III. A WORLD AGENDA FOR DEVELOPMENT: GLOBAL DETERMINANTS OF PROSPERITY

68. Against the background of the enormous and rapid changes in world political and economic conditions, which placed new and urgent demands on international cooperation for development, there was a general consensus on the need for a world agenda for development. This agenda is to respond to the urgent demands for international cooperation, to restore the imperative of development as a central concern for the world and to achieve greater stability and prosperity for all. Although opinions varied regarding ways and means to attain that objective, a number of global determinants of stability and prosperity were identified and discussed.

69. Poverty and unemployment, other economic and social inequities or environmental degradation could breed, as their root-causes, social unrest, political instability or even military conflict. Conditions for just, comprehensive and lasting peace were seen as essential prerequisites for long-term and sustainable development. For these reasons, international peace and security were increasingly viewed to encompass not only political and military aspects but, more fundamentally, economic, social, human and environmental dimensions. Accordingly, the linkage between an Agenda for Peace and an Agenda for Development was strongly emphasized.

70. Beyond their common quest for peace and security, there was a broad recognition of the mutuality of interests of developed and developing countries by virtue of the inter-linked prosperity of the former with the longer-term development of the latter. In this regard, the problems confronting the more developed countries were emphasized in the hearings. Unemployment continued at high levels in the developed market countries and income disparities were increasing. The economies in transition were experiencing much greater economic difficulties than had been originally foreseen. Neither group's problems could be solved in

isolation. The process of globalization - including technological progress, enhanced trade and capital flows, expanded multi-national production and international migration of people - is creating an integrated world and reinforcing the need for international cooperation through partnership. Transborder concerns, such as the spread of communicable diseases and environmental pollution, are making such cooperation more imperative.

71. The comparatively rapid economic growth in several countries of the South in the 1990s was providing a significant impulse to the world economy. It is important to sustain and consolidate such gains in the interest of all countries and people. Further integration of all countries into the global economy was also viewed as an essential factor for long-term growth and development.

72. The need to raise awareness and consciousness about development issues and to foster a new and larger international constituency for development was also stressed. The underlying material and other reasons for the convergence of long-term interests of both North and South, to be emphasized in an agenda for development, would include international political stability, expansion of export and capital markets, preservation of the environment, limitation of excessive population growth and promotion of democracy.

73. Yet, others contended that mutual interests alone do not provide an adequate basis for solutions to all the challenges and imperatives of development, especially with regard to the poorest people and the poorest countries. Thus, the principal motive for an agenda for development should be human solidarity for greater international justice and equity and a strong commitment to put an end to mass deprivation and suffering.

74. The role of the United Nations system in the area of development was examined. The United Nations was a valuable instrument for international development cooperation. It was recognized that the main strengths of the United Nations lie in the universality of its membership and the potential to address the inter-related matters of peace and security and development in an integrated and coherent manner. Deliberations on an agenda for development were seen as most opportune to take stock of the various proposals and to arrive at a generally acceptable agreement.

IV. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

75. Although the role of the United Nations system was scheduled to be considered at the last day of the hearings, this theme ran through the entirety of the meetings.

76. While all agreed that the basic principles of the United Nations, as expressed in its Charter, remained fully valid, there was at the same time a widespread sense of disenchantment and disillusionment with the workings of the United Nations system. This led many to warn that an agenda for development should not be too self-congratulatory when it addressed the United Nations. An agenda for development could not be meaningful without proposing radical reforms

in the United Nations system whose structure and functioning were becoming increasingly outdated.

77. Opinions varied on what form the reshaping of the United Nations should take. They range from radical reform to less drastic measures. Several panelists appeared dubious about many of the more radical proposals and seemed to be more inclined to stay within the existing structures and try to improve them.

78. There was general agreement that an agenda for development had to contain not only specific, concrete and pragmatic proposals which could be translated into action and could be operationalized, but also should specify the required actions themselves. An agenda for development should take an integrated approach while setting priorities. There was also the view that it should reflect the wide diversity among developing countries which required different approaches. In this regard, the dismal situation in sub-Saharan Africa received special attention.

79. The present institutions were considered inadequate to deal with the world's development challenge. This was not only the case with the United Nations but also with respect to the G-7 and the Bretton Woods institutions. Still, in the economic and social areas, the United Nations was viewed as particularly weak and lacking in general leadership and direction. In order to overcome this lacuna, one proposal was for the appointment of a Deputy Secretary-General for economic affairs.

80. However, perhaps too much was expected from the United Nations. It could not take decisions; rather it was a debating forum. It was not designed to deal with macroeconomic management and was not an economic policy body like a sovereign state. Consequently, some saw the United Nations' role primarily in terms of consciousness raising and mobilizing and influencing public opinion by giving political impulses for action at the national level and multilateral levels in the specialized agencies and other international institutions.

A. Economic Security Council

81. A number of witnesses proposed the creation of a comparatively small and high level body whose decisions would have the kind of authority in economic and social matters as the Security Council's decisions had in peace and security matters. The various bodies whose creation was proposed, and which are discussed below, were: an Economic Security Council, a Social and Economic Security Council, a Development Security Council, a Development Council and an Economic High Authority. It was also proposed that the role of the present Security Council be enlarged.

82. Specificity as to composition and other organizational matters varied but the main thrust behind the idea for such a small high level Council was the shared belief that, if the current structures were to continue unchanged, the United Nations would become more and more irrelevant in the development arena.

83. Some noted that the root causes of conflicts were not only political and military but also, and perhaps more fundamentally, economic and social. Therefore, the Security Council should broaden its interpretation of threats to peace and security to include economic and social issues. This would embrace the idea of "preventive assistance or development".

84. It was artificial to separate peace and development and unrealistic to argue that the Security Council could not deal with development issues once it was admitted that lack of development caused breaches in security. The fiftieth anniversary could be an opportunity not only for enlarging the Security Council but also for making it responsible for development issues.

85. If, for some reason, the Security Council would not take development issues on board, then an Economic or Development Security Council would have to be created. This body could be seen as akin to a cabinet in the United Nations.

86. Another approach was to create a Social and Economic Security Council as a separate arm of the Security Council and composed of 25 members who would discuss and negotiate social, economic and ecological issues at a high political level. It would meet in permanent sessions with permanent economic representatives, sometimes at cabinet level.

87. The rationale for such a body was that, in order for the United Nations to be taken seriously, real discussions rather than the reading of statements would have to take place. Therefore, it had to be a small body. With currently 184 member states and counting, no real discussions were possible with the result that decisions were made in the G-7 or G-5. If this approach was not followed, the United Nations would not be able to affect or influence decisions made elsewhere. It was time to bring that decision making inside the United Nations. This new structure also called for the establishment of a cabinet around the Secretary-General composed of international public politicians, like ministers, who would have freedom of manoeuvre and would be accountable to the Social and Economic Security Council.

88. The call for an Economic High Authority was based on the need for managing the world economy. This required international policies and corresponding institutions to implement them. Such a High Authority would give coherence to policies and institutions. It should bring representatives of all continents together with those from the international financial institutions as well as regional groupings. It should formulate common goals, commitments and strategies and see to it that they were properly implemented. It should achieve coherence between the agendas for peace and development.

89. Yet another proposal was the creation of a Development Council composed of the G-7, representatives of the G-77 and OPEC. Its task would be minimizing policy conflicts that arose in the management of interdependence through pre-emptive actions, dialogue and negotiations. This Council would be supported by a High Commission of Development Cooperation Agencies with the Secretary-General as the chairman. The Commission in its turn would be supported by an independent secretariat.

90. One expert did not support an Economic Security Council if it were to mean cross-sectoral policy coordination in the areas of trade, money, finance and development. Such coordination had a poor track record. Rather, one should strengthen the policy role of each of the major institutions involved in these four areas, according to the principle of subsidiarity, and improve the operational interaction between their respective managements and staff.

91. Several panelists questioned the advisability of the creation of an Economic Security Council or similar such body. Besides problems emanating from the Charter, the issue of sovereign equality and democratic representation were also raised. It would have to take a global perspective, otherwise some countries would become even more marginalized. Furthermore, while the Security Council dealt with crises, an Economic Security Council would have to go beyond economic crises; it would have to address long-term issues. The view was also expressed that too much time was spent on never ending reform discussions and less on substantive issues.

B. ECOSOC

92. Not surprisingly, those who advocated the establishment of an Economic Security Council were generally not well disposed to ECOSOC.

93. ECOSOC had not lived up to its original expectations and the level of representation at its sessions was considered too low. Revitalizing ECOSOC was unlikely to produce any meaningful result and its functions should be transferred to the proposed Economic Security Council and/or the General Assembly.

94. Overlapping intergovernmental bodies had to be abolished. There were too many bodies where the same issues were discussed; each issue should be fully handled and disposed of in one body, based on subsidiarity principles. Also there were too many issues. There was need to set priorities; instead new issues were added without eliminating others. In this connection, the adoption of sunset clauses appeared particularly important.

95. Some still saw a role for ECOSOC, albeit without its coordination mandate. Its tasks would be confined to monitoring United Nations technical assistance bodies, to overseeing the international regulatory framework, and to addressing global environmental issues.

96. Others, however, saw merit in a reformed or revitalized ECOSOC. Coordination was not entirely absent in world development efforts and, if it was wanting, it was not solely because of a failure in ECOSOC. Coordination efforts had to become more balanced and more attention had to be given to economic issues. At present, however, policy coordination on economic matters was carried on outside the United Nations in the G-7 and Bretton Woods institutions. Successful revitalization of ECOSOC depended on political will, and efforts to improve ECOSOC should continue.

97. None the less, the query was raised whether it was worth the bother to join ECOSOC as it seemed little more than a talk shop and rubber stamp. It was agreed that the political relevance of ECOSOC was crucial but that its achieving this had thus far proved elusive.

98. There was considerable dissatisfaction with ECOSOC's performance in coordination. Greater coordination in development cooperation depended on a reasonable degree of consensus among governments on development strategies broadly defined. Furthermore, if coordination were to have any legitimacy it had to be elevated to a level comparable to peace-keeping, with the principal actors in world development fully engaged.

99. A dissenting opinion was that less coordination had its positive aspects; it brought about competition and separated the chaff from the corn. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that coordination was not without costs both in terms of time and resources. Also, effective coordination could not be achieved simply by legislative or administrative fiat.

100. Another view was that ECOSOC should create a formal United Nations Council of Economic Advisors which would issue an annual report on steps needed to promote growth and development. In addition, ECOSOC should, every five years, establish a special commission which would advise it on reform of all major development institutions.

101. It was also suggested that the UNDP Administrator be given the additional responsibility of providing effective leadership across the development components and in exercising overall coordination. The reason for this suggestion was that this kind of management coordination could not be provided by ECOSOC.

C. Specialized Agencies

102. The current United Nations system bore little resemblance to the original design. Numerous agencies and programmes had been added. The result was a much larger but less coherent system marked by strengths and weaknesses, inadequate coordination and no central steering.

103. It was suggested to merge the various entities dealing with trade; food and agriculture; environment; investment and industry; and technical assistance. There were too many actors involved in each of these areas which made it possible for governments to circumvent them.

104. The specialized agencies had to be brought under the jurisdiction of the Secretary-General. They were too much bound to their special constituencies and coordination among them through ACC was seen as inadequate.

105. On the other hand, it was pointed out that the United Nations could never become a single system directed from the centre. Like governments, the United Nations was not a business. It could be made more efficient but its goal was justice and not profits, and achieving justice could not always be done efficiently.

106. Even though technical assistance had contributed significantly to the development of developing countries, over time the specialized agencies' technical capacities had declined in comparison to the capacity of developing countries themselves. Therefore, the efficiency of the specialized agencies had to be improved. Fundamental reform was needed, otherwise the system would not survive. If the specialized agencies could not fulfil particular tasks more effectively than other bodies, there was little reason for them to continue undertaking them. The system had to become more competitive in that agencies should concentrate on where they had a comparative advantage. Perhaps the 50th anniversary of the United Nations could also be an appropriate occasion for reform and reassessment of roles within and among the specialized agencies.

107. At present there was no clear rationale governing the involvement of the United Nations in many issues - this led to ineffectiveness, inefficiency, duplication and overlap. For example, it was suggested that the involvement of UNDP and the World Bank in technical assistance could be better left to private enterprise, NGOs, universities or the recipient countries themselves. However, in the African context, such an approach was not considered realistic. Technical assistance through the United Nations system, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, was still essential.

108. None the less, there was a tendency for agencies to take on the whole development agenda without selectivity or interest of complementarity. As a consequence their role at national levels had a broad, albeit superficial, approach and was - in practice - often fragmentary.

109. There was also a need for complementarity between multilateral and bilateral aid. Now there was overload because there were too many actors. This required joint action through the United Nations system but that meant major institutional revision. However, institutional resistance was strong and the only way to overcome this resistance lay with the member states. Member states on the various governing boards had to be consistent, thereby forcing agencies to be true to their original mandates and to act responsibly with others.

D. Bretton Woods Institutions

110. The relationship between the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions was an important theme within the discussions on the role of the United Nations system. Opinions differed as to how the link between the two should be improved and strengthened.

111. A number of panelists and some of the experts expressed their dissatisfaction with the fact that more and more tasks had moved from the United Nations to the Bretton Woods institutions. Consequently the United Nations ran the risk of becoming increasingly marginalized. There should be only one system and the Bretton Woods institutions should be guided by General Assembly resolutions as foreseen in the Charter. The Secretary-General should participate in the joint meetings of the World Bank and the IMF and present statements on various world issues. In turn, the Bretton Woods institutions should present their annual

reports to ECOSOC on their activities and show how they were implementing General Assembly resolutions.

112. However, it was noted that calling for better linkages between the two was a non-starter as long as the United Nations did not become more politically relevant. That was why a body such as an Economic Security Council was important. A politically efficient body in the United Nations would be of interest to the major actors and would make them active in the United Nations. The current situation was such that decisions could be taken in the Bretton Woods institutions but not in the United Nations.

113. Furthermore, it was pointed out that the international financial institutions had become less narrowly focused on solely economic issues. Social aspects are now also taken into account and this is a positive development. Also, if the Bretton Woods institutions carry out their activities more in accordance with the general wishes of the international community, then, following the principles of subsidiarity, there will be less of a need for the United Nations to do the same things. The United Nations is more than only a funding agency; it is also an institution which conducts discussions and negotiations on policies, the implementation of which could and should be left to others.

114. Once it is recognized that the United Nations does not have to do all things and that subsidiarity principles have their validity, then not only could it be slimmed down but also its credibility would increase when it requests increases in resources.

115. Attention was paid to reform of the voting systems, i.e., harmonizing the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions. The latter should become more democratic like the United Nations and the voting of the former could be weighted to improve its decision making. An example was the Global Environmental Facility which contained elements of both voting systems. While it was stated that, as long as one dollar equal led one vote, development could not be considered people centred, it was also observed that one country equalling one vote was not very democratic either because of differences in population size. However, if the United Nations voting system were to change, changes leading to a more truly democratic character should also take place in the Bretton Woods institutions.

116. The implementation of structural adjustment programmes (SAPS) was scrutinized. The proposed Economic Security Council was seen as the appropriate body to monitor, at the political level, the social, economic, employment and environmental consequences of SAPS.

117. Some argued that SAPS should be freed from all conditionalities. Another view was that social conditionality should become as important as economic conditionality. The social agencies of the United Nations should help the international financial institutions define goals and actions, provide financial and technical assistance and monitor results. Thus countries' progress should not only be monitored in terms of economic targets but also in reaching social goals and realizing human rights.

118. Others noted that the main problem with SAPS was that they were designed on a country-by-country basis with possible disastrous consequences for the international system. For example, case-by-case emphasis on promoting exports of the same commodity had led to the collapse of prices due to the resulting global oversupply.

119. Proper coordination and overview by the United Nations of these SAPS was considered essential. Coordination between the United Nations and other international development institutions did exist but the formal inter-agency coordination mechanisms were of limited value although the consultative groups and round-tables were of some use.

120. Therefore, it was proposed that UN Resident Coordinators as well as relevant agencies be involved in SAPS negotiations between the Bretton Woods institutions and national governments. Resident Coordinators should be given the authority to coordinate the work of the United Nations system at the country level. At present there was only partial coordination with no control over the Bretton Woods representatives. However, the contrary view was expressed that the Resident Coordinators did not have the necessary expertise or sometimes prestige to carry out coordination tasks. Therefore, it would be better to give this task to the World Bank representative.

121. Besides the above mentioned problems of coordination, it was argued that there is lack of coordination among the GATT, the IMF, and the World Bank as well. There is a need for comprehensive strategies in order to get rid of compartmentalization and so a close link between the Economic Security Council and the Bretton Woods institutions is essential.

122. The World Trade Organization (WTO), originally envisaged at the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944, had finally become a reality. It was seen as a landmark decision which would reinforce the multilateral trading system and reverse trends towards bilateralism and unilateralism. The WTO was also important in terms of monitoring compliance with trading rules and dispute settlements.

123. However, it was observed that the United Nations may be left out of the discussions at the WTO. At present it is unclear whether the WTO is to become part of the United Nations system at all. It is desirable that the United Nations play a role in the WTO as the latter might not pay sufficient attention to a number of important development issues of interest to developing countries, such as commodities. Again the importance of a political body in the United Nations was stressed if the organization wants to influence the debates in the WTO.

E. United Nations Development Funds

124. The end of the cold war was seen as a significant factor influencing the respective roles of the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions. The important concepts of universality and impartiality within the United Nations which had originally given it its strength and uniqueness, had been eroded. Similarly, the agendas of the Bretton Woods institutions had become increasingly concerned with issues that traditionally belonged to the United Nations.

The notion of comparative advantage between the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions was therefore difficult to use in streamlining and strengthening these development bodies. Still, it is only the United Nations which cuts across political, social and economic issues and United Nations funds were still the largest source of international grant assistance with the widest in-country networks.

125. Based on that analysis, a number of specific functions for the United Nations could be identified. These encompassed international assistance in cases of emergency and transition from conflict to peace. Both were overwhelming international development cooperation. Without building and strengthening institutional capacities, the longterm aspects of development would be lost. In addition, the United Nations should be involved with mobilizing international support for targeted tasks such as basic human needs and the building of national capacities as well as consensus building and consciousness-raising with respect to global security and sustainable development.

126. For the United Nations development funds to be supportive of these functions, it was proposed to merge them. Such a merger would overcome fragmentation, link emergency and development assistance efforts, provide an opportunity for streamlining, and encourage priority setting by governments.

127. The merging of the United Nations development funds was met with considerable skepticism. Loss of identity and constituency loyalty were seen as major drawbacks. Rather than merging the funds, better cooperation among them, as well as among donor countries, was advocated. Also the fear was expressed that with UNDP taking the lead role in such a merger, it could impose development priorities on governments and country offices could become the equivalent of supranational embassies.

F. The need for special attention to the least developed and marginalized countries

128. As a result of globalization, there is a risk that the majority of poorer developing countries will be left behind unless urgent action is taken. Consequently, a priority attention of the United Nations should be to focus on the poorest countries, especially those in Africa, and the least developed countries. The United Nations should work towards a convergence of views among the international community on the priority needs of the poorer developing countries, in particular the least developed countries and other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, for technical and financial assistance.

129. UNCTAD was seen by several as the appropriate forum for the focus on the least developed countries. UNCTAD should help these countries to improve their capacities to adopt appropriate domestic policies and, in cooperation with the United Nations system, to mobilize the required external resources to that end.

130. Some panelists stressed that UNCTAD should recover its broader role of coordinator of technical assistance and in policy analysis. It was agreed that UNCTAD had to be revitalized. but it should take the new political realities into account as well as the differences among developing countries. Old coalitions were no longer relevant and were too rigid within regional groupings.

G. Development Finance

131. There was a new imperative for development finance because of globalization. With the globalization of markets, there was no mechanism by which the gainers compensated the losers. Thus it was asserted that aid should be a right and be unconditional. Within a country taxes were levied and revenues were not based on voluntary contributions. People should therefore not depend on charity. There was a need for international safety nets which would involve improved resource flows to poor countries which had no access to private flows, accelerated debt-write-offs for the poorest countries, and a true emergency fund to finance relief efforts.

132. Proposals were made to introduce international taxation to finance the development activities of the United Nations. These included an international tax on low elasticity commodities, on the use of common property resources (e.g the sea bed), on international capital transactions, and on transnational corporations' profits. All of these could be sources of finance for international safety nets. Furthermore, this international taxation should be accompanied by a legal, enforceable mechanism so that donors could be held to commitments.

133. One view was advanced that there should be rules on common behavior with respect to development finance in the United Nations. There had to be a verification machinery to enforce implementation of donor pledges. Without such rules on finance, the United Nations was poorly placed to plan its development assistance well in advance. It was suggested that the Security Council could intervene to enforce financial pledges.

134. However, it was pointed out that if the Security Council could discipline donors or impose sanctions, the risk would arise that no more pledges would be forthcoming. Moreover, if there were legal obligations to transfer resources then there would have to be also legal obligations for the recipients as to how the resources were to be used. Perhaps, rather than imposing sanctions on donors, there should be a code of conduct on aid for both donors and recipients. Under such a scheme, the press and public opinion could become the judges of the efforts of all governments, donors and recipients alike, to help disadvantaged countries and people.

H. Norms and standards

135. There was general agreement that the United Nations played an important role in setting norms and standards. Many multilateral agreements had contributed to this work. However, norms and standards were often disregarded.

136. United Nations goals and targets were desirable but they were not very effective because they were loosely monitored and not enforced. Thus, in the United Nations there was a growing gap between what was said and what was done. This caused a problem of credibility as intentions were not followed by compliance or, where applicable, resource allocations.

137. The United Nations should not only set the rules but also monitor the adherence to them and establish mechanisms to enforce them. One expert proposed strengthening the supra-national character of the United Nations as well as the position of the Secretary-General so as to able to compel governments to discuss an issue. At present, the gap between decision and implementation was large.

138. Another area where the United Nations should become more active was in the design and management of international regulatory frameworks which, in an increasingly globalized economy, lagged far behind national arrangements.

139. Rules of the game were becoming much more important as the world economy has become more interdependent and the private sector the main driving force.

I. Reduction of military expenditures

140. There was a role for the United Nations in stopping arms traffic. Efforts had to be made on both the demand and supply sides. Greater use should be make of the United Nations arms register. One proposal was that arms traffic should be considered by the new economic security council.

141. It was proposed that the five permanent members of the Security Council, which are the main suppliers of arms to world markets, should control their own arms transfers and use their moral authority to appeal to other suppliers to control their transfers. Regional groupings could keep records of arms transfers and troop movements among themselves and in this way confidence would be built up among themselves.

142. Another proposal was that there should be an enforceable code of conduct for aid flows. This would govern the performance of both donors and recipients. The latter would commit themselves to advance democracy and not to exceed a certain level of military spending. The question of making aid or the provision of resources from multilateral financial institutions conditional on countries not exceeding a certain level of military expenditure was raised.

143. It was suggested that an examination be made of where the "peace dividend" had gone and why it had not materialized in the form of extra flows to developing countries.

J. Non-State Actors

144. Globalization made it imperative for the United Nations to expand its role through involving official and non-state actors. It was time to bring once isolated spheres together. Rather than viewing such interactions as risking the weakening of the state by bringing in non-state actors, some of whom were not democratically elected, the state would be strengthened by having contacts with other actors. In fact, the value that could be derived from such interactions was clearly manifested by the hearings themselves.

145. Thus it was proposed to establish in the United Nations a consultative machinery including such main actors as representatives of the business community (e.g. chambers of industry and commerce), international banks, transnational corporations, unions and employers' organizations.

146. Furthermore, more direct links between the United Nations and people in countries had to be forged. This should not be accomplished through governments but rather through such mechanisms as people's assemblies, parliamentary assemblies, a United Nations court, or a United Nations High Commissioner for Minorities. This approach would make the United Nations more legitimate in the eyes of the people.

APPENDICES

I. LEGISLATIVE MANDATE, PROCESS AND FORMAT OF THE HEARINGS

A. Legislative mandate

By its resolution 48/166 of 21 December 1993 entitled "An agenda for development", the General Assembly invited the President of the Assembly to promote, in an open-ended format, as early as possible in 1994, broad-based discussions and an exchange of views on an agenda for development, on the basis of the report of the Secretary-General requested in its resolution 47/181. It also invited the President of the General Assembly, in order to ensure the broad-based nature of those discussions, to invite relevant programmes, funds and agencies of the United Nations system, relevant multilateral institutions and other relevant organizations, including scientific and academic institutions, to participate fully in or present their views during those discussions. It requested the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session further recommendations, as appropriate, to follow up his report on an agenda for development, taking into account, inter alia, the views presented during the discussions promoted by the President of the General Assembly and summarized under his own responsibility.

B. Process

Pursuant to the above-mentioned mandate, the President of the General Assembly, H.E. Mr. Samuel R. Insanally, Permanent Representative of Guyana to the United Nations, initiated an open-ended process of broad-based discussions and exchanges of views on an agenda for development, by adopting a multi-faceted, unorthodox and innovative approach.

"In search of fresh ideas for advancing a new campaign towards a development strategy for the year 2000 and beyond", the President of the General Assembly invited some 30 experts and eminent figures (see list below) to testify at the World Hearings on Development, convened by him from 6 to 10 June 1994 at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. This initiative sought to involve the broadest possible array of governmental and non-governmental authorities from various walks of life in both developing and developed countries -- politicians, business, academia, labour, media -- all of them active in the development process. The Hearings afforded those expert witnesses a direct opportunity to lend their expertise and to share their experience, through their testimonies, for the benefit of Member States who were represented on the panels (see list below) and who were ultimately responsible for the formulation of development policies. The Hearings were intended to engender a stimulating dialogue on how development may be best promoted in the new post-cold-war era and to serve as a catalyst to foster an interaction of ideas leading to a new approach to development.

The Hearings were held against the backdrop of the report of the Secretary-General entitled "An Agenda for Development" (A/48/935). In his address to the Hearings, the Secretary-General stated: "All our actions, be they keeping a lasting peace, ensuring economic growth, integrating environmental concerns in growth policies, promoting social justice and fostering democratic change, must conform with a vision of development. Our aim must be nothing less than to establish the foundations of this new culture." He further pointed out: "The purpose of the Charter has become our keynote for the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations in 1995: "We the Peoples of the United Nations ... United for a Better World." Development is a better world. It is not the best possible society of the utopians, it is not the end of history, it is a legacy for our children better than the world we have made for ourselves." The Hearings contemplated following up the search for innovative ideas on how to realize the Secretary-General's call for a "compelling, collective, new, and revitalized" vision of development centred within the United Nations system.

In addition, the process of consultations on an agenda for development included the submissions -- written testimony -- not only by expert witnesses present at the Hearings but also by the programmes, funds and agencies of the United Nations system, which were directly concerned with economic and social issues (see list below).

C. Format

The Hearings were arranged to cover the following five distinct themes: (1) Development, Peace and Security; (2) Challenges and Imperatives of Growth and Sustainable Development: Putting People First; (3) Globalization: Impact and Required Action; (4) A New Partnership for Global Development; and (5) Coordination and Institutional Support: The Role of the United Nations System. On each theme there were scheduled two sessions of Hearings. Accordingly, the Hearings were organized for the total of ten sessions.

At each session, testimony was given by two to four eminent persons knowledgeable in the area of international economic cooperation and development. A total of thirty-one Expert Witnesses (see list below) testified at the Hearings. Each speaker had been asked to submit, in advance of a deadline of 31 May 1994, a written summary of his/her testimony (see list below), for the benefit of the Panel. Each speaker presented orally his/her views, on the issue on which he/she had been invited to testify, before a Panel and an Audience, during the Hearings. Each presentation was limited to approximately 15 minutes speaking time, targeting for a total speaking time from 45 minutes to one hour per session.

Following his/her presentation, the Expert Witness was questioned further on his/her views by the Panel. About 30 minutes were allotted per Expert Witness for that round of individual questioning by the Panel. In the second round of questions and answers, the Expert Witnesses responded to the questions from the Audience, to the extent time permitted. Such questions were posed in writing and submitted to the Panel Leader who read them out. Responses by each Expert Witness in that segment were normally restricted to 5 minutes. Questions were also required to be brief and succinct.

The composition of the Panels largely varied for all sessions. One panelist served as the Panel Leader for each session. The Panels were composed of senior Government representatives, with the exception of the Panel Leaders who were selected by the President of the General Assembly from among a select group of either high-level officials attending from capitals or other eminent persons (see list below).

The President of the General Assembly performed the role of the Chairman of all proceedings of the Hearings. On occasion, however, he delegated that task to several Vice-Presidents of the General Assembly. In that way the umbilical link between the Hearings and the General Assembly was maintained. In particular, the Chairman was responsible for calling the Hearings to order, announcing the theme for discussion and the names and origins of the Expert Witnesses making presentations at each session. The Chairman also introduced the Panel Leader who then proceeded with the conduct of work. At the conclusion of discussion on each theme, the Chairman presented a brief oral summary. The Chairman also presented his closing remarks at the conclusion of the Hearings.

Following the introductory announcements by the Chairman, the Panel Leaders were responsible for the proceedings. At each session, the Panel Leader outlined the procedure, and specifically concerning the submission of questions, and introduced the Panel Members. He/she then summon each successive Expert Witness and organize the sequence of questions both from the Panel and the Audience and answers of the Expert Witness to them.

II. LIST OF EXPERT WITNESSES AND PANELISTS

Monday, 6 June 1994

Theme I: Development, peace and security

1st meeting

Expert Witnesses:

His Excellency General Olusegun OBASANJO, former President of the Republic of Nigeria.

Ms. Emma BONINO, Deputy Speaker, member of the Italian Parliament Presidency and the Foreign Affairs Commission.

Panel Leader:

Dr. Leonard SILK, Research Fellow, Ralph Bunche Institute, Graduate School of the City of New York.

Panel Members:

1. H.E. Mr. Karel KOVANDA, Permanent Representative of The Czech Republic to the United Nations.

2. Mr. Hervé LADSOUS, Deputy Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations.

3. H.E. Dr. Kamal KHARRAZI, Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations.

4. H.E. Mr. Victor FLORES OLEA, Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations.

5. H.E. Mr. Don Juan Antonio YANEZ-BARNUEVO, Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations.

6. H.E. Sir David HANNAY, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations.

2nd meeting

Expert Witnesses:

Professor Helio JAGUARIBE DE MATOS, Dean of the Institute of Political and Social Studies in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

Professor XUE Mouhong, Guest Scholar of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.

Professor Mrinal DATTA-CHAUDHURI of the Delhi School of Economics.

* * *

Testimony of His Royal Highness Crown Prince El Hassan Bin Talal of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was delivered by the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations.

Panel Leader:

Mr. Matti WUORI, former Chairman of Green Peace International and currently Human Rights lawyer in Finland.

Panel Members:

1. H.E. Dr. Edgar CAMACHO OMISTE, Permanent Representative of Bolivia to the United Nations.

2. Mrs. Dawlat Ibrahim HASSAN, Chargé d'affaires of the Permanent Mission of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the United Nations.

3. H.E. Mr. André ERDOS, Permanent Representative of Hungary to the United Nations.

4. H.E. Mr. Shunji MARUYAMA, Deputy Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations.

5. Mr. S. THANARAJASINGAM, Deputy Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations.

6. H.E. Dr. Nicolaas H. BIEGMAN, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations.

Tuesday, 7 June 1994

Theme II: Challenges and imperatives of growth and sustainable development: putting people first

3rd meeting

Expert Witnesses:

Ms. Margaret CATLEY-CARLSON, President of The Population Council in New York.

Professor Ryokichi HIRONO, Faculty of Economics of Seikei University in Tokyo.

Dr. Antonella PICCHIO, Visiting Professor in the Department of Economics at the New School for Social Research in New York.

Panel Leader:

Mr. Matti WUORI, Former Chairman of Green Peace International and currently Human Rights lawyer in Finland.

Panel Members:

1. H.E. Mrs. Louise FRECHETE, Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations.

2. H.E. Mr. Alvaro ZUNIGA, Deputy Permanent Representative of Chile to the United Nations.

3. H.E. Mr. CHEN Jian, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations.

4. H.E. Mr. Fernando REMIREZ de ESTENOZ BARCIELA, Permanent Representative of Cuba to the Untied Nations.

5. H.E. Dr. Lucille MATHURIN MAIR, Permanent Representative of Jamaica to the United Nations.

4th meeting

Expert Witnesses:

His Excellency Mwalimu Julius K. NYERERE, former President of the United Republic of Tanzania.

Dr. Lawrence R. KLEIN, Benjamin Franklin Professor of Economics of the Department of Economics at the University of Pennsylvania, and the 1980 recipient of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science.

Panel Leader:

Dr. Anthony GONZALES, Senior Lecturer, International Relations, University of the West Indies, Trinidad and Tobago.

Panel Members:

1. H.E. Dr. Gerhard Walter HENZE, Deputy Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations.

2. Mr. Philip R.O. OWADE, Chargé d'affaires, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kenya to the United Nations.

3. H.E. Mr. Utula Utuoc SAMANA, Permanent Representative of Papua New Guinea to the United Nations.

4. H.E. Dr. Danilo TURK, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Slovenia to the United Nations.

5. H.E. Mr. Victor MARRERO, Representative of the United States of America to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

Wednesday, 8 June 1994

Theme III: Globalization: impact and required action

5th meeting

Expert Witnesses:

His Excellency Mr. Jean-Marie GUEHENNO, Permanent Representative of France to the Western European Union.

Ms. Frances STEWART, Director of Commonwealth Studies at Oxford University.

His Excellency Dr. CHO Soon, former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Planning of the Republic of Korea.

Dr. Francis DENG, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C.

Panel Leader:

Mr. Carlos PEREZ del CASTILLO, President, Consultora CPC International, Limited.

Panel Members:

1. H.E. Dr. Satteeanund PEERTHUM, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Mauritius to the United Nations.

2. H.E. Mr. Mihai Horia C. BOTEZ, Permanent Representative of Romania to the United Nations.

3. H.E. Dr. Stanley KALPAGE, Permanent Representative of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka to the United Nations.

4. H.E. Mr. Amor ARDHAOUI, Deputy Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations.

5. Mr. John BLANEY, Deputy Representative of the United States of America to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

6th meeting

Expert Witnesses:

Mr. Ted TURNER, Chairman of the Board and President of Turner Broadcasting System in Atlanta, Georgia, USA.

Dr. Paul KENNEDY, Director of International Security Studies of the Department of History at Yale University.

His Highness Prince Alfred von LIECHTENSTEIN, President of the Vienna Academy for the Study of the Future.

Mrs. Ella CISNEROS, President of The Together Foundation for Global Unity in Caracas, Venezuela.

Panel Leader:

Professor Solita COLLAS-MONSOD, Professor of Economics, School of Economics, University of the Philippines.

Panel Members:

1. H.E. Mr. Ramtane LAMAMRA, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United Nations.

2. H.E. Mr. Ronaldo Mota SARDENBERG, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations.

3. Dr. George PAPADATOS, Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Greece to the United Nations.

4. H.E. Mr. Isaac E. AYEWAH, Deputy Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations.

5. H.E. Professor Perezi KARUKUBIRO KAMUNANWIRE, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Uganda to the United Nations.

Thursday, 9 June 1994

Theme IV: New partnership for global development

7th meeting

Expert Witnesses:

Professor Wangari MAATHAI, Coordinator of The Green Belt Movement, a project founded by the National Council of Women of Kenya.

Dr. Hans-Helmut TAAKE, Director of the German Institute for Development Policy.

Mr. Makoto TANIGUCHI, Deputy Secretary-General of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Panel Leader:

Sir Alister McIntyre, Vice-Chancellor of the University of the West Indies, Jamaica.

Panel Members:

1. H.E. Mr. Eugene M. PURSOO, Permanent Representative of Grenada to the United Nations.

2. H.E. Mr. Preet M.S. MALIK, Special Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs of India. (Represented alternately by H.E. Mr. T.P. SREENIVASAN, Deputy Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations).

3. Mr. Eduard V. KUDRYAVTSEV, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations.

4. Mr. Mame Balla SY, Chargé d'affaires of the Permanent Mission of Senegal to the United Nations.

5. H.E. Mrs. Annette des ILES, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago to the United Nations.

8th meeting

Expert Witnesses:

Mr. Pierre DEFRAIGNE, Director for North/South Relations at the European Commission.

Professor Norman GIRVAN, Director of the Consortium Graduate School of Social Sciences at the University of the West Indies in Jamaica.

Dr. Sigrun MOGEDAL, Director of the Centre for Partnership in Development in Oslo, Norway.

Mr. Kasuno CHIBA, Honorary Research Fellow of the Centre for International Studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science, former Ambassador of Japan to the United Kingdom, Chairman of the GATT Council in 1985 and Chairman of the GATT Contracting Parties in 1986.

Panel Leader:

Mrs. Floria NIKOI, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ghana and current Chairman of the Council of the Ghana Stock Exchange.

Panel Members:

1. Mrs. María del Luján FLORES, Deputy Permanent Representative of Uruguay to the United Nations.

2. H.E. Mr. Nugroho WISNUMURTI, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations.

3. H.E. Mr. Nouhoum SAMASSEKOU, Permanent Repre- ntative of the Republic of Mali to the United Nations.

4. H.E. Mr. Chong-Ha YOO, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations.

5. Ms. Melinda KIMBLE, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs at the State Department of the United States of America.

Friday, 10 June 1994

Theme V: Coordination and institutional support: role of the United Nations system

9th meeting

Expert Witnesses:

His Excellency Mr. Jan PRONK, Minister for Development Cooperation of the Netherlands.

Dr. Catherine GWIN, Vice-President of the Overseas Development Council in Washington, D.C.

Mr. Havelock ROSS-BREWSTER, Executive Director at the Inter-American Development Bank.

Panel Leader:

Mrs. Gloria NIKOI, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ghana and current Chairman of the Council of the Ghana Stock Exchange.

Panel Members:

1. Mr. Ronaldo Mota SARDENBERG, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations.

2. H.E. Mr. Bruno E. RODRIGUEZ PARRILLA, Deputy Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations.

3. Mr. Hervé LADSOUS, Deputy Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations.

4. Mr. S. THANARAJASINGAM, Chargé d'affaires of Malaysia to the United Nations.

5. H.E. Mr. CHEW Tai Soo, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Singapore to the United Nations.

6. Mr. Ngoni Francis SENGWE, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Republic of Zimbabwe to the United Nations.

10th meeting

Expert Witnesses:

Professor Hans SINGER from the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, United Kingdom.

Mr. Charles William MAYNES, former Assistant Secretary of State, USA, and currently Editor of the quarterly publication Foreign Policy.

Mr. WANG Baoliu, Minister and Special Adviser on Economic Issues of the International Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China.

Panel Leader:

Mr. Goran OHLIN, former Assistant Secretary-General for Development Research and Policy Analysis in the United Nations.

Panel Members:

1. H.E. Mr. Reaz RAHMAN, Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of Bangladesh to the United Nations.

2. H.E. Mr. Karel KOVANDA, Permanent Representative of the Czech Republic to the United Nations.

3. H.E. Mr. Peter OSVALD, Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations.

4. H.E. Mr. Enrique TEJERA-PARIS, Permanent Representative of Venezuela to the United Nations.

III. LIST OF SUBMISSIONS - WRITTEN TESTIMONY - BY EXPERT WITNESSES AND OTHERS CONCERNED

Submissions by expert witnesses

1. His Excellency General Olusegun OBASANJO, former President of the Republic of Nigeria and Chairman, Africa Leadership Forum.

2. Ms. Emma BONINO, Deputy Speaker, member of the Italian Parliament Presidency and the Foreign Affairs Commission.

3. Professor Helio JAGUARIBE DE MATOS, Dean of the Institute of Political and Social Studies in Rio de Janeiro.

4. Professor XUE Mouhong, Guest Scholar of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.

5. His Royal Highness Crown Prince El Hassan Bin Talal of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

6. Ms. Margaret CATLEY-CARLSON, President of The Population Council in New York.

7. Professor Ryokichi HIRONO, Faculty of Economics of Seikei University in Tokyo.

8. Dr. Antonella PICCHIO, Visiting Professor in the Department of Economics at the New School for Social Research in New York.

9. His Excellency Mwalimu Julius K. NYERERE, former President of the United Republic of Tanzania.

10. Dr. Lawrence R. KLEIN, Benjamin Franklin Professor of Economics of the Department of Economics at the University of Pennsylvania, and the 1980 recipient of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science.

11. His Excellency Mr. Jean-Marie GUEHENNO, Permanent Representative of France to the Western European Union.

12. Ms. Frances STEWART, Director of Commonwealth Studies at Oxford University.

13. His Excellency Dr. CHO Soon, former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Planning of the Republic of Korea.

14. His Highness Prince Alfred von LIECHTENSTEIN, President of the Vienna Academy for the Study of the Future.

15. Mrs. Ella CISNEROS, President of The Together Foundation for Global Unity in Caracas.

16. Professor Wangari MAATHAI, Coordinator of The Green Belt Movement, a project founded by the National Council of Women of Kenya.

17. Dr. Hans-Helmut TAAKE, Director of the German Institute for Development Policy.

18. Mr. Makoto TANIGUCHI, Deputy Secretary-General of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

19. Pierre DEFRAIGNE, Director for North/South Relations at the European Commission.

20. Professor Norman GIRVAN, Director of the Consortium Graduate School of Social Sciences at the University of the West Indies in Jamaica.

21. Dr. Sigrun MOGEDAL, Director of the Centre for Partnership in Development in Oslo.

22. Mr. Kasuno CHIBA, Honorary Research Fellow of the Centre for International Studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science, former Ambassador of Japan to the United Kingdom, Chairman of the GATT Council in 1985 and Chairman of the GATT Contracting Parties in 1986.

23. Mr. Jan PRONK, Minister for Development Cooperation of the Netherlands.

24. Dr. Catherine GWIN, Vice-President of the Overseas Development Council in Washington, D.C.

25. Mr. Havelock ROSS-BREWSTER, Executive Director at the Inter-American Development Bank.

26. Professor Hans SINGER from the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex.

27. Mr. Charles William MAYNES, Editor of the quarterly publication Foreign Policy.

28. Mr. WANG Baoliu, Minister and Special Adviser on Economic Issues of the International Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China.

29. Dr. Francis DENG, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C.

Contributions by international organizations

1. Major Issues in Development: A contribution from the International Labour Office.

2. Commonwealth Secretariat submission for World Hearings on Development.

3. Submission by the World Food Programme.

4. Elements for a United Nations Industrial Development Organization position.

5. Written submission by Mr. Wally N'Dow, Assistant Secretary-General for the Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat).

6. Analysis and recommendations by United Nations Development Fund for Women.

7. A Brazilian approach to an Agenda for Development.

8. Submission by Mohammad Sadli, Professor of Economics, University of Indonesia, former Minister of Mines and Petroleum, member of an economic advisory team to President Suharto, current President of the Non-Aligned Movement.

9. Challenges and imperatives of growth and sustainable development by Ernst Ulrich von Weizsacker, Suppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy.

10. Paper by Oxfam (UK and Ireland), "Improving the UN's response to conflict-related emergencies".

11. Paper by Bruce Thordarson, Director-General, International Co-operative Alliance.

12. "India - An approach paper on the agenda for development".

13. World Economic Forum - "Linkages between economic, social and political development".

14. The Agenda for Development and the Restructuring of the International Economic Organizations Implications for SELA.

15. Written submission by the United Nations Drug Control Programme.

16. Agenda for Development: The Perspectives of the OAU - Submission by the Permanent Observer Mission of the OAU to the United Nations.

17. World Hearings on Development - UNEP's Input.

18. Written submission by the CARICOM Secretariat.

19. Written submission by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

20. Written submission by UNCTAD.

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NATIONS

A

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HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS, INCLUDING ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVE ENJOYMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS

Regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights

Report of the Secretary-General

Introduction

1. In its resolution 47/125 of 18 December 1992, entitled "Regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights", after reaffirming that regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights may make a major contribution to the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and that the exchange of information and experience in this field among the regions, within the United Nations system, may be improved, the General Assembly welcomed the continuing cooperation and assistance of the Centre for Human Rights of the Secretariat in the further strengthening of the existing regional arrangements and regional machinery for the promotion and protection of human rights, particularly in regard to advisory services and technical assistance, public information and education, with a view to exchanging information and experience in the field of human rights.

2. In the same resolution, the General Assembly stressed the importance of the programme of advisory services in the field of human rights and renewed its appeal to all Governments to consider making use of the possibilities offered by the United Nations, under this programme, of organizing information and/or training courses at the national level for government personnel on the application of international human rights standards and the experience of relevant international bodies. It invited States in areas where regional arrangements in the field of human rights did not yet exist to consider

* A/49/150.

agreements with a view to the establishment within their respective regions of suitable regional machinery for the promotion and protection of human rights.

3. The Assembly requested the Secretary-General, as foreseen in the medium-term plan for the period 1992-1997, to continue to strengthen exchanges between the United Nations and regional intergovernmental organizations dealing with human rights, and welcomed, in that connection, the fact that the Centre for Human Rights would continue to organize national, regional and subregional workshops and training courses for governmental officials engaged in the administration of justice and in the implementation of the international human rights instruments and that more countries in all regions of the world were expected to develop forms of cooperation and assistance with the Centre, in keeping with their specific needs. It invited the organizers of regional meetings convened in preparation for the World Conference on Human Rights held in 1993 to promote further ratification of and accession to United Nations human rights treaties and the implementation of universally accepted human rights standards.

4. The Assembly requested the Commission on Human Rights to continue to pay special attention to the most appropriate ways of assisting, at their request, countries of the different regions under the programme of advisory services and to make, where necessary, the relevant recommendations; lastly, it requested the Secretary-General to submit to it at its forty-ninth session a report on the state of regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights and to include therein the results of action taken in pursuance of the resolution. This report has been prepared in response to that request. Information, by region, concerning the status of ratification of the principal international human rights instruments is annexed hereto.

I. Cooperation and development of contacts between the United Nations and regional bodies

5. The Centre for Human Rights pursued and strengthened its contacts and cooperation with the established regional organizations in the field of human rights, namely the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. This cooperation was developed through exchanges of information on questions of mutual interest and activities under the programme of advisory services and technical assistance established by the United Nations for human rights.

6. The Centre for Human Rights is aware of the importance of exchanges of information with these organizations. Information is exchanged regularly on the ratification of human rights instruments. Further to a recommendation made at the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the World Conference on Human Rights, the Centre published a new compilation of international and regional human rights instruments, which replaced the publication entitled Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments. The format of the publication has been changed and now consists of two volumes, each divided into two parts: volume I contains universal instruments and volume II regional instruments. Two issues of the periodical Human Rights International Instruments: Chart of

Ratifications appeared in 1993. The compilation entitled Human Rights: Status of International Instruments contains detailed information on ratifications, reservations, objections and declarations relating to the human rights instruments included in the compilation.

7. In addition, the Centre has continued cooperating with a wide range of institutions and organizations operating in different regions of the world, including the Commonwealth Secretariat Human Rights Unit, the International Institute of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France, the International Institute of Humanitarian Law in San Remo, Italy, the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights in San José, Costa Rica, the Andean Commission of Jurists in Lima, Peru, the African Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies in Banjul, the Gambia, the Arab Institute for Human Rights in Tunis, Tunisia, the International Centre for Sociological, Penal and Penitentiary Research and Studies in Messina, Italy, the International Institute for Higher Studies in Criminal Science in Siracusa, Italy, the Henri Dunant Institute in Geneva, the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of the University of Lund, Sweden, the Graduate Institute of Higher International Studies in Geneva, the Ecole internationale in Bordeaux, France, and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific.

8. Briefings were also provided at their request to many human rights and academic institutions, including Liverpool Institute of Public Administration and Management, United Kingdom, Institut des hautes études commerciales de Liège, Belgium, Amsterdam School of International Relations and Erasmus University, the Netherlands, and Fédération française des clubs UNESCO, France.

9. By means of its advisory services and technical assistance activities, the Centre for Human Rights further pursued and strengthened the regional promotion of human rights in 1993, chiefly through exchanges of information and experience. These activities, which comprise training courses, seminars, workshops, study grants, the provision of expert opinions on legal questions, assistance for the development and strengthening of national institutions and electoral assistance, are described in detail in the report on advisory services in the field of human rights (E/CN.4/1994/78 and Corr.1, Add.1, Add.2 and Add.2/Corr.1, and Add.3 and Add.3/Corr.1), submitted by the Secretary-General to the Commission at its fiftieth session. Additional information is contained in the report of the Secretary-General on regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights in the Asian and Pacific region, prepared in pursuance of Commission on Human Rights resolution 1993/57 (E/CN.4/1994/40). The information provided in those reports will not be repeated here, save for brief references, if necessary, in the following sections dealing with specific regions.

10. The publications programme of the Centre for Human Rights is constantly evolving to meet the growing demand for human rights information. Documents on human rights are distributed to national and regional human rights institutions, academic and research institutions, the media, non-governmental organizations and concerned individuals. The Centre has conducted a thorough and comprehensive revision of its information programme in order to review and renew its overall information strategy in terms of its policy, goals, target audience and methods of work. The report of the Secretary-General (E/CN.4/1994/36 and Add.1) provides an overview of the Centre's information programme and the World

Public Information Campaign for Human Rights launched by the General Assembly in 1988.

A. Africa

11. Cooperation between the United Nations and the African regional system was promoted by means of seminars, training courses and workshops organized by the Centre for Human Rights in cooperation with a number of organizations based in the region or elsewhere, including the International Commission of Jurists, the Raoul Wallenberg Institute and the Cultural and Technical Cooperation Agency.

12. The Centre conducted needs assessment missions in Burundi, Malawi, Namibia and South Africa. The purpose of these expert advisory missions was to make practical proposals for the preparation of a medium- and long-term assistance programme. Assistance was provided to Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Lesotho, Malawi and South Africa for holding elections and to South Africa for constitutional activities. The Centre also provided financial support for constitutional law reform in the United Republic of Tanzania and for the organization of a seminar in Yaoundé, Cameroon, for the members of the National Commission on international standards and the relationship between human rights and the democratic process.

13. Technical cooperation between the Centre and the Government of Burundi was promoted through a training course on the implementation of international norms relating to human rights and the administration of justice. The Centre organized a pre-election seminar in Angola on democracy, human rights and free and fair elections as part of civic education efforts. In collaboration with the Egyptian Government, the Centre is organizing a training course for trainers of police officers and civil servants. Another training course was held in Mozambique in collaboration with the Department of Peace-keeping Operations for United Nations police officers engaged in peace-keeping operations.

14. In cooperation with the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, the Cultural and Technical Cooperation Agency and the African Commission on Human and People's Rights, the Centre organized a seminar on techniques of preparing and presenting periodic reports for 14 French-speaking countries in Africa. The purpose of the seminar was to promote a better understanding of the international system for the promotion and protection of human rights and to enhance the experience of national officials responsible for drafting and presenting periodic reports.

15. The Centre provides financial support to the African Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies in Banjul. It also provides support to the Arab Institute for Human Rights for the strengthening of its documentation centre, the reorganization of documents distribution programmes and the organization of seminars and training courses in human rights. The Centre continued its programme of cooperation with the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in a number of fields, including the strengthening of its documentation centre, the reproduction collection, cataloguing and distribution of human rights documents and the strengthening of the Commission in terms of staffing and organizational structures.

B. Asia and the Pacific

16. The Asian and Pacific region has no official intergovernmental infrastructure to deal with human rights, although the question of provision of regional intergovernmental institutions to promote and protect human rights has been the subject of continuing consultations. For further details, see the separate report of the Secretary-General (E/CN.4/1994/40). In 1993, the Centre for Human Rights sent several missions to Cambodia to prepare for its office to be set up in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1993/6.

17. In 1993, the Centre for Human Rights continued to cooperate with the Executive Secretary of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), with a view to creating a depository centre for United Nations human rights materials at ESCAP in Bangkok. In this regard, the Centre drew States Members' attention to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1993/57. The views expressed by Governments in their replies are contained in the aforementioned report. In cooperation with the Government of Indonesia, the Centre organized an Asian and Pacific workshop on human rights issues, national institutions and regional arrangements, which was held in Jakarta from 26 to 28 January 1993. Another workshop for Asia and the Pacific dealing with the establishment of regional and subregional infrastructure and national institutions for the protection of human rights was held from 18 to 20 July 1994 by the Centre for Human Rights in Cooperation with the Government of the Republic of Korea.

18. Throughout the period under consideration, the Centre has also carried on its programme of advisory services and technical assistance. Technical assistance was supplied to Cambodia for the holding of elections and to Mongolia to carry out the translation into the Mongolian language of the report on measures to ensure the independence and reinforce the judiciary of Mongolia. The report was also to serve as a reference tool for the Mongolian authorities in connection with the ongoing legislative reform related to the judicial system. A training course on human rights for Cambodian human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) was established by the Centre.

C. Europe

19. The regional system of the Council of Europe for the protection of human rights is based on the twin pillars of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights, each one of which has a specific and complementary function with regard to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Centre for Human Rights has been cooperating with the Council of Europe for many years so as to initiate, undertake and/or reinforce a number of projects relating to human rights, including some in central and eastern Europe.

20. In Tajikistan, the Centre has, as part of its constitutional assistance mission, helped to draft the constitution of the country by holding a seminar in Geneva which brought together a number of constitutional experts, who shared their experience and ideas with the representatives of the Republic of

Tajikistan involved in the constitutional reform, advising them to incorporate certain norms of international law into the domestic legislative system.

21. Through its programme of advisory services and technical assistance, the Centre has provided electoral assistance to Albania and Romania as part of the democratization process. In the electoral process, the Centre's assistance has been reinforced by the cooperation which has grown up between the Centre on the one hand, and the United Nations electoral assistance service and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on the other. The Centre has also given its support to legislative reforms in Belarus and the Russian Federation, by supplying them with international experts and specialized personnel, in order to promote the establishment of domestic legislation which conforms to the norms of international human rights law, whether regional or universal. Poland has also benefited from support to national institutions active in the promotion of human rights. In July 1993, a seminar was organized by the Institute of Law Studies of the Polish Academy of Science to evaluate the level of conformity of Polish penal legislation with relevant international standards.

22. Slovakia received help from the Centre in establishing a human rights centre. In Albania and Romania, the Centre has organized seminars and training courses in human rights and the administration of justice for police academy teachers, judges, lawyers and prosecutors. Under its new programme relating to the resolution of conflicts between citizens and state organs, the Centre organized workshops in Bucharest on techniques and actors involved in resolving these conflicts. Romania and Albania sent participants to a training course organized in November 1993 at the Palais des Nations in Geneva on the preparation of periodic reports, as well as training sessions for teachers on human rights education.

23. In cooperation with UNDP, the Centre gave financial and material assistance to many NGOs, including some in Romania. Besides the organization of a colloquium on human rights and the media, assistance needs and current human rights projects in Romania were evaluated so as to judge how far these projects may be coordinated and carried out comprehensively. Projects under way or as yet at the planning stage will be carried out or finished during 1994. The same applies to projects planned or being undertaken in Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Hungary, Lithuania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Poland, Romania and the Russian Federation.

D. The Americas

24. The inter-American human rights system includes the Inter-American Court and Commission on Human Rights, which were created as regional organs to promote and protect human rights. These bodies were given specific functions and powers by the American Convention on Human Rights, compatible with the principles of the American declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man. As States and regional bodies are encouraged to seek its help and support, the Centre for Human Rights takes part at several levels in the activities of these bodies and other institutions of the Organization of American States (OAS), seeking and developing cooperation with them. The independent expert for Guatemala

continued in 1993 to provide technical assistance on legislation relating to the indigenous peoples of Guatemala.

25. Under its advisory services and technical assistance programme, the Centre has worked for the development and reinforcement of Costa Rican human rights institutions. By agreement with the Governments of Costa Rica and Spain, the Centre provided support for two Costa Rican officials of the Office of the "Defensor del Pueblo" (Ombudsman) to study first hand the workings of similar institutions in Spain from 2 to 6 August 1993. In Uruguay, the Centre supported the organization of workshops and introductory courses on human rights in the administration of justice for magistrates, police and prison officials. Moreover, a meeting of experts to elaborate documents relating to human rights in the administration of justice brought together experts from America as well as from other continents. In Uruguay, through its programme of advisory services and technical assistance, the Centre has continued its efforts to publicize international instruments relating to the administration of justice.

26. In 1993, a report of the mission to evaluate the Centre's support project for the office of the Presidential Adviser for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in Colombia described the progress made with the help of financial assistance and suggestions from the Centre and UNDP. Following the technical cooperation agreement signed in April 1990 between the Government of Paraguay, UNDP and the Centre, a programme to disseminate information on and provide training in human rights was carried out, and was completed in August 1993. In addition, the Centre financed the participation of representatives from Paraguay in human rights training courses, from 17 to 27 August 1993, organized by the Inter-American Organization for Human Rights. A seminar on the rights of indigenous populations, from 29 June to 1 July 1994, brought together experts from Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and 17 regional ethnic groups.

27. Under the mandate of the independent expert for Guatemala, a Centre official was appointed to work in that country in order to encourage the return of nationals who had sought refuge in Mexico, and to supply assistance and advice as requested by the Guatemalan Government. In Haiti, from 26 February to 14 March 1993, the Centre took part in an international civilian mission and provided a training course for government personnel. In November 1993, the Centre approved the creation of a national human rights centre for documentation, training and advisory services in Argentina.

II. CONCLUSION

28. Within the framework of the medium-term plan for the period 1992-1997, the Secretary-General will continue to strengthen exchanges between the United Nations and regional intergovernmental organizations dealing with human rights, and to pay special attention to countries which have no official intergovernmental human rights infrastructure, so that they may benefit from all the activities under the programme of advisory services and technical assistance for human rights. The Centre for Human Rights will continue to organize national, regional and subregional workshops, training courses and seminars for interested officials on the application of international human rights standards.

29. Recognizing the important role played by local NGOs in disseminating information on the international standards to which Governments have subscribed, the Centre has resolved to make as widely available as possible, in the appropriate languages, the international human rights instruments adopted by the United Nations.

Annexes

Explanatory note: The annexes list the status of the ratification of the principal international human rights instruments, by region.

1. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

3. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

4. Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty.

5. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

6. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.

7. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

8. Convention on the Rights of the Child.

9. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.

10. Convention on the Political Rights of Women.

11. Convention on the Nationality of Married Women.

12. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

13. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

14. Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.

15. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.

Annex I

STATUS OF RATIFICATION BY AFRICAN STATES OF PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS

(as at 31 December 1993)

	RATIFICATIONS														
STATES	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Algeria	X	X a/	X		X b/	X	X	X				X c/	X	X	
Angola	X	X	X					X	X	X			X	X	
Benin	X	X	X			X		X	X			X	X	X	
Botswana					X								X	X	
Burkina Faso					X	X	X	X	X				X	X	
Burundi	X	X			X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X	
Cameroon	X	X	X		X	X		X				X	X	X	
Cape Verde	X	X			X	X		X	X			X		X	
Central African Republic	X	X	X		X	X		X		X			X	X	
Chad					X	X		X					X	X	
Comoros								X							
Congo	X	X a/	X		X	X		X	X	X			X	X	
Côte d'Ivoire	X	X			X			X					X	X	
Djibouti								X					X	X	
Egypt	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X
Equatorial Guinea	X	X	X					X	X				X	X	
Eritrea															
Ethiopia	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	
Gabon	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	
Gambia	X	X a/	X		X	X	X	X	X				X	X	
Ghana					X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	
Guinea	X	X	X		X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X	
Guinea-Bissau	X							X	X				X	X	
Kenya	X	X						X	X				X	X	
Lesotho	X	X			X	X	X	X		X	X		X	X	
Liberia					X	X	X	X	X				X	X	
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Madagascar	X	X	X		X	X		X	X	X			X		
Malawi	X	X						X	X	X	X		X	X	
Mali	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	

/...

	RATIFICATIONS														
STATES	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Mauritania					X	X		X		X			X	X	
Mauritius	X	X	X		X			X	X	X	X	X			
Morocco d/	X	X			X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X
Mozambique		X		X	X	X	X	X					X	X	
Namibia					X	X		X	X						
Niger	X	X	X		X	X		X		X			X	X	
Nigeria	X	X			X	X		X	X	X			X	X	
Rwanda	X	X			X	X	X	X	X				X	X	
Sao Tome and Principe						X		X					X	X	
Senegal	X	X a/	X		X b/	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	
Seychelles	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	
Sierra Leone					X			X	X	X	X		X	X	
Somalia	X	X	X		X	X						X	X	X	
South Africa															
Sudan	X	X			X	X		X					X	X	
Swaziland					X					X	X			X	
Togo	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X			X c/	X	X	
Tunisia	X	X a/			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X c/	X	X	
Uganda	X				X	X		X	X		X	X	X	X	
United Republic of Tanzania	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	
Zaire	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	
Zambia	X	X	X		X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X	
Zimbabwe	X	X a/			X	X	X	X	X				X	X	
Number of States parties	38	37	19	1	42	38	21	48	35	26	12	17	45	46	2

a/ Declaration recognizing the competence of the Human Rights Committee under article 41 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

b/ Declaration recognizing the competence of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination under article 14 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

c/ Declaration recognizing the competence of the Committee against Torture under articles 21 and 22 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

d/ Morocco is not a member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

Annex II

STATUS OF RATIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS BY ASIAN AND PACIFIC STATES

(as at December 1993)

	RATIFICATIONS														
STATES	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Afghanistan	X	X			X	X	X	X		X		X			
Australia	X	X a/	X	X	X b/		X	X	X	X	X	X c/	X	X	
Bahrain					X	X	X	X							
Bangladesh					X	X		X	X						
Bhutan								X	X						
Brunei Darussalam															
Cambodia	X	X			X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	
China					X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	X	X					X	X							
Fiji					X		X	X		X	X		X	X	
India	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X					
Indonesia								X	X	X					
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	X	X			X	X	X						X	X	
Iraq	X	X			X	X	X	X	X						
Israel	X	X			X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Japan	X	X						X	X	X			X	X	
Jordan	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Kiribati															
Kuwait					X	X		X							
Lao People's Democratic Republic					X	X	X	X	X	X					
Lebanon	X	X			X		X	X		X					
Malaysia											X				
Maldives					X	X	X	X	X						
Marshall Islands								X							
Micronesia (Federated States of)								X							
Mongolia	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X					

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	RATIFICATIONS														
STATES	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Myanmar							X	X							
Nauru															
Nepal	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X			
New Zealand	X	X a/	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X c/	X	X	
Oman						X									
Pakistan					X	X	X	X		X					
Papua New Guinea					X		X	X		X			X	X	
Philippines	X	X a/	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	
Qatar					X	X									
Republic of Korea	X	X a/	X		X		X	X	X	X			X	X	
Samoa									X				X		
Saudi Arabia							X								
Singapore											X				
Solomon Islands	X				X					X					
Sri Lanka	X	X a/			X	X	X	X	X		X	X			
Syrian Arab Republic	X	X			X	X	X	X							
Thailand								X	X	X					
Tonga					X		X								
Tuvalu													X	X	
United Arab Emirates					X	X									
Vanuatu								X							
Viet Nam	X	X			X	X	X	X	X						
Yemen	X	X			X	X d/	X	X	X	X		X	X d/	X d/	
Number of States parties	21	20	6	2	31	23	29	35	23	20	8	11	14	13	0

a/ Declaration recognizing the competence of the Human Rights Committee under article 41 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

b/ Declaration recognizing the competence of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination under article 14 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

c/ Declaration recognizing the competence of the Committee against Torture under articles 21 and 22 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

d/ Ratification, accession, approval, notification or succession acceptance or final signature only by the former Republic of Yemen.

Annex III

STATUS OF RATIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS BY EUROPEAN STATES

(as at 31 December 1993)

	RATIFICATIONS														
STATES	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Albania	X	X			X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Andorra															
Armenia	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	
Austria	X	X a/	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X c/	X	X	
Azerbaijan	X	X						X					X	X	
Belarus	X	X a/	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Belgium	X	X a/	X		X		X	X	X	X			X	X	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	X	X a/			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Bulgaria	X	X a/	X		X b/	X	X	X	X	X	X	X c/	X	X	
Croatia	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X c/	X	X	
Cyprus	X	X	X		X b/		X	X	X	X	X	X c/	X	X	
Czech Republic	X	X a/	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Denmark	X	X a/	X	X	X b/	X	X	X	X	X	X	X c/	X	X	
Estonia	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X			X			
Finland	X	X a/	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X c/	X	X	
France	X	X	X		X b/		X	X	X	X		X c/	X	X	
Georgia	X	X	X				X	X							
Germany	X	X a/	X	X	X	X c/	X	X	X	X	X	X c/	X	X	
Greece	X				X		X	X	X	X		X c/	X	X	
Holy See					X			X					X	X	
Hungary	X	X a/	X	X	X b/	X	X	X	X	X	X	X c/	X	X	
Iceland	X	X a/	X	X	X b/		X	X	X	X	X		X	X	
Ireland	X	X a/	X	X			X	X	X	X	X		X	X	

	RATIFICATIONS														
STATES	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Italy	X	X a/	X		X b/		X	X	X	X		X c/	X	X	
Kazakhstan															
Kyrgyzstan															
Latvia	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Liechtenstein												X c/	X	X	
Lithuania	X	X	X					X	X						
Luxembourg	X	X a/	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X c/	X	X	
Malta	X	X a/	X		X			X	X	X	X	X c/	X	X	
Monaco							X	X				X c/	X		
Netherlands	X	X a/	X	X	X b/		X		X	X	X	X c/	X	X	
Norway	X	X a/	X	X	X b/		X	X	X	X	X	X c/	X	X	
Poland	X	X a/	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X c/	X	X	
Portugal	X	X	X	X	X			X	X			X c/	X	X	
Republic of Moldova	X	X			X		X	X		X					
Romania	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Russian Federation	X	X a/	X		X b/	X	X	X	X	X	X	X c/	X	X	
San Marino	X	X	X					X							
Slovakia	X	X a/	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	
Slovenia	X	X a/	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X c/	X	X	
Spain	X	X a/	X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X c/	X	X	
Sweden	X	X a/	X	X	X b/		X	X	X	X	X	X c/	X	X	
Switzerland	X	X a/		X								X c/	X	X	
Tajikistan								X	X				X	X	
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	X	X			X	X		X	X						
Turkey							X		X	X		X c/	X	X	
Turkmenistan								X							
Ukraine	X	X a/	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
United Kingdom	X	X a/			X		X	X	X	X		X d/	X	X	

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	RATIFICATIONS														
STATES	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Uzbekistan															
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X c/	X	X	
Number of States parties	43	42	32	16	38	19	38	45	40	35	25	37	39	38	0

a/ Declaration recognizing the competence of the Human Rights Committee under article 41 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

b/ Declaration recognizing the competence of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination under article 14 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

c/ Declaration recognizing the competence of the Committee against Torture under articles 21 and 22 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

d/ Ratification, accession, approval, notification or succession acceptance or final signature only by the former German Democratic Republic prior to reunification.

Explanatory notes

States members of the Council of Europe

Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

States enjoying special status with the Council of Europe

Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Latvia, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine.

States enjoying observer status with the Council of Europe

Israel, Holy See.

States members of the Commonwealth of Independent States

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.

Other States

Monaco, Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

Annex IV

STATUS OF RATIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS BY THE STATES OF NORTH AMERICA, THE CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA

(as at 31 December 1993)

	RATIFICATIONS														
STATES	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Antigua and Barbuda					X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X c/			
Argentina	X	X a/	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X c/	X	X	
Bahamas					X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	
Barbados	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
Belize								X	X			X	X	X	
Bolivia	X	X	X		X	X		X		X			X	X	
Brazil	X	X			X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Canada	X	X a/	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X c/	X	X	
Chile	X	X a/	X		X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X	
Colombia	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	
Costa Rica	X	X	X		X b/	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	
Cuba					X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
Dominica	X	X						X	X						
Dominican Republic	X	X	X		X			X	X	X	X		X	X	
Ecuador	X	X a/	X	X	X b/	X	X	X	X	X	X	X c/	X	X	
El Salvador	X	X			X	X	X	X	X				X	X	
Grenada	X	X						X	X						
Guatemala	X	X			X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Guyana	X	X a/	X		X	X		X	X			X			
Haiti		X			X	X	X		X	X			X	X	
Honduras	X						X	X	X				X	X	
Jamaica	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	
Mexico	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Nicaragua	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	
Panama	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	
Paraguay	X	X						X	X	X		X	X	X	
Peru	X	X a/	X		X b/	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	

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	RATIFICATIONS														
STATES	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Saint Kitts and Nevis								X	X						
Saint Lucia					X			X	X		X				
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X				X		
Suriname	X	X	X		X	X		X	X				X	X	
Trinidad and Tobago	X	X	X		X	X		X	X	X	X				
United States of America		X a/					X			X				X	
Uruguay	X	X	X	X	X b/		X	X	X			X c/	X	X	
Venezuela	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	
Number of States parties	27	28	19	4	28	21	24	33	33	23	16	17	23	24	0

a/ Declaration recognizing the competence of the Human Rights Committee under article 41 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

b/ Declaration recognizing the competence of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination under article 14 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

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